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The lumber industry today is ~)oth similar to and different from the
nation's other major industries. The similarity stems from the fact that
all of these industries have had a definite, well-defined transition
period from an era dominated bymanys~lall, independent entrepreneurs to
an era dominated by a 5mB.ll number of large corporations. The dissim-
ilaritybetween the lumber industry and the other industries is that with
the lumber industry the domination by the few large firms has never been
\
as total in scope as that domination by the giants of such industries
as oil and transportation.
This dissimilarity has been the cause of no srna.ll amount of dis-
cussion and tension between various individuals and groups interested in
the continued well-being of the lumber industry. The opponents of the
large corporations claim that the trend i9 the lumber industr~r toward
domination by a few firms has been just as complete as that experienced
in other industries. Not only has it been complete, they claim, but the
extensiveness of this domination has had a negative effect on the whole
lumber industry, stifling competition and. driving the small, independent
operator from the scene.
Those.who support the theory that this domination of the lumber
industry by the few large firms has never been completed on a basis corn-
parable to other industries can offer·much factual proof to support their
argument, and in doing so much evidence can also be offered to refute
the theory that this rise to positions of seeming dominance by a few
lumber producers has had a bad effect on the industry~ These advocates
of the cause for "Big I,wIlber II argue that if i.t h2_d not been for the
emergence of a few strong leaders in thE' lumber industry, giving to the
industry the direction and guidancE it so badly needed, corrrrnercial lum-
bering on a large scale ma.y· have been doomed in the United States.
The purpose of this thGS'lS is to open this argument once again
with the intention of' provinE tha.t certain 1UJ11:)e1' producers did emerge
to dominate the industr:;T although that c~omination was never complet,€.
Also,. the attempt is made to present a ~30und case in favor of these
large lumber firms as being the instruments which were actually to sa.ve
the lumber industry and to guarantee its permanent future existence.
The method used to prove this position l,alillbe that of a detailed
historical study of the ea.rly lumber industr~/ in the United States from
colonial times until shor·tly a.fter the turn of the present century.
Such a study is definite~y needed for it reveals the complete story of
why it was possible for a feli firms to gain a high degree of control
over the entire industry and yet still allow for the existence of a vast
number of smaller, independent competitors. Also, such a study reveals
how the transition was accomplished. Finally, through the examination
of' the lumber industry's early history, one is able to see quite clear-:-
ly the significance of this movement to the mouern lwnber industry.
The evidence unveiled by this study goes far in support of a major theme
of this thesis, namely that the positive industrial leadership and in-
fluence_ generated by these few Targe lumber producers more than offset
any ill effects their grmvth had on the lumber industry.
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INTHODUCTION
A key factor in the econo~ic success of the United States lies
in the integration and concentration of the majority of the nation's
industrial power within the hands of a small nllinber of large firms.
This phenomenon is in evidence in almost "every industry today whether
it be that of steel, ITQning, oil, transportation, or banking. Further-
_more, this concentration of pmvcr has in almost every instance elimin-
ated the small and medilliIl sized processors of the country's ba.sic
res ources, leaving onlJT" two, three, or a half a dozen industrial giants
to control the given industry. A notable exception to this trend has
been _the lwnber industry. True, there vIas at" the turn of the century
a definite move towa.rd this concentration of power vrithin the lwnber
industry, and it was attained to a certain degree, but the lumber in-
dustry still remains today relatively free of total domination by a
few firms. How the leading elements of the industry were able to achieve
this concentration and yet failed to attain complete domination is a
fascinating story. To understand it completely, it is nece"ssar;y to
ex&uine closely the early history of the IQmber industry. Such a study
reveals definite clues to possible reasons why the developnent of
luniliering did not follow the standard pattern of development of big
b"usiness in the United States.
Hovlever, before beginning such a study there must be a definition
of terms and of subject matter to be covered in order to limit the topic
and to bring the proper focus to it. This investigation concerns itself
2strictly l,fith the lUlnber industry to the exclusion of other closely
related industries, such as the paper pulp industry'. This thesis is
concerned with only thc:.t segment of the tota.l timber industry vlhich is
engaged in the harvesting, smving, and milling of timber into boards,
.framing lumber, and patterned lumber for use in genera.l construction.
As the study progresses, it will take into account related industries
only as they presently affect the large, integrated timber processing
corporations. Prima.ry consideration will be reserved for the lumber
industry as defined.
AlSO, there can and should be a limitation placed on the geograph-
ical lloobering areas to be considered in this study. In examining the
concentration of pmver within the lumber industry, the histori.cal in-
vestigation may be restricted to the industry's development across the
northern part of the United states from New England through the Upper
Midwes.t·to the Pacific North~vest. In doing this we naturally exclude a
major area of lumber production and history, namely the South. The
reason for this exclusion is that the nature of the southern lwnber in-
dustry and its development are basically different from that of the
industry in the rest of the nation. In the South lumbering has tradi-
ionally been centered around the sma.ll producer processing the native
yellmv pine for the southern market. Historically, there have been no
mass migrations of the industry fr.om the South to other forest regions
of the nation, and even \'rithin the South itself there has been no definite
pattern of. internal shifts of locale. True, the southern industry is
in direct competition with that of the Pacific North~vest and other areas,
and the southern lumber industry has contributed to the development of
3the industry in other regions through the efforts of such individuals as
R.A. Long and a nl.1.1Jlber of other equally capable men viho migrated from
the South to the North and Fa~ West. However, in the final analysis the
di.fferences between the South and the other lumbering areas in timber
species, manufacturing methods and philosophy, product emphasis, labor
force, and other considerations allow one to make this exclusion and
thus limit the topic considerably.
CHAPrER I
As any United States history book.will point out, the early
colonists were quick to realize the potentials of the seemingly end-
less forests \vhich they found up and down the Atlantic seaboard.
With this unlimited supply of timber it was only natural that the early
logging and lumber busi.ness should spring up in all areas. As the
trees were cleared from the land, the settlers used the logs to build
their homes and their furniture. BCJ""ond their iffilTIediate needs the
colonists at first d-emanded only a small amount of logs and lumber. l
Hm.,rever, as the population gre1v and inlproved equipment came into exist-
ence, the colonists began to realize the iJnportance of the forests.
A lumber industry was created, prj~itive to be sure, but nevertheless
one in which certain individuals could concentrate their efforts and
produce not only enough logs and lumber to satisfy their own needs.
but also the demands of the surrounding area.
The lumber industry, like most other industries during the coloni-
al period, ,'ras characterized by the small independent operator, the more
or less local trade area, 8...l1d an unorganized la.bor force. Asoccupati.on-
8.1 specialization began to take place within each cornmimity, certain
individuals, becau:se of previous experience or natural inclination,
became the early lwnbermen of the area. These first sawmills were own-
ed by individuals either alone or in partnership l,vith others in the
1
. Curtis P. Nettles, fhc· Emergence .of a National Ecol1:...oml (New York:
Holt, Hinehart, & tiinston, 1962), p.277.
5COIllillWlity and were at best primitive_ The lack of power-driven equip-
ment necessitated the use of hand tools which caused the process of
turning a log into lumber to be a long and laborious chore_ The
awkwardness and bulk of the logs did create a need for additional labor
to help in the sa\v.mills, but the nature of the work did not demand nay
special skill_ As a result, the early mill owners could hire any handy...
man to help, and when the job was completed, the extra help was released.
Still, these mills were able to meet the lurnberdemands of their local
area_ The homes and buildings of the early colonial period did not
demand too many refinements in their construction, and pince logs and
later lumoer needed for their construction could be easily obtained
in the irmnediate area, there was little need to look elsewhere for a
supplier.
From the suppliers I standpoint, even if there had been a great
demand from tne outside for lumber, the lack of proper equipment, the
inadequate labor supply, the lack of sufficient transportat ion, and
the inexperience of the mill mvners themselves in producing for a large
market would have restricted the production of these ear1Jr operations.·
However, as time went by the population of the colonies grew,
causing a great increase in the demand for lumber to be used in con-
struction. There was at the same time a great increase in the demand
from other areas, principally the domestic and foreign shipbuilding
industry. As the European po1'rers increased their drive for colonial
possessions, the demand for bigger and better navies and merchant marines
greatly increased the demand for lumber. Great Britain and the Nether-
lands had 'WTestled the initiative away from Spain, and both nations Here·
6greatly enlarging their fleets in order to meet the demands of their
overseas empires. Not only did the British and the Dutch need ships
for their colonial requirements, but both nations were also vying with
each other to become the chief carrier for the exports of the other
nations of the world. This particular demand for shipbuilding lumber
had great significance for America's early lumber industry for both
Great' Britain and the Netherlands were almost completely deficient in
forest resources. To meet their needs, both countries naturally turned
to the American colonies,for it was in the forests of America that the
Europeans· found the type of timber which was ideally suit.ed to their
shipbuilding specifications.
Conversely, as the demand increased, the supply was increased
sharply. Certain of the early lumbermen realized the profit possibilities
of the expanded market and acted accordingly. Basic improvements were
made in methods and machinery, and, together with the increased labor
supply resulting from the growing tide of immigration, these innovations
allowed· the early lumber industry to meet the challenge. In doing so
they began to get away from the provincialism of the original lumbermen.
Improved and expanded communication systems, particularly roads and
domestic shipping, were a great factor in this change •. Improvement in
the road system had made inland toltms, such as Albany ~ New York and
Lancaster, Pennsylvania, into busy·commercial centers. 2 . In regard·to
domestic shipping the increase in tonnage which occurred in the late 1700's
2Emory Johnson, ~istory of Domestic and Foreign Co.~nerc$of·the
United States (Hashington, D.C.:C&rnegie Institute, 1915), I,p. ·20h.
The author points out that when the first turnpike in the United ·States
was opened in 1792 betvreen Philadelphia and Lancaster, "it probably
carried more traffic than any other road of the day."
7and the early 1800's was no less dramatic. From a total of 447,754
gross tons in 1793 American shipping rose to 1,089,876 gross tons by
1807, signifying a corresponding increase in shipping tra.ffic.3 No
~onger was a producer restricted to his own immediate trade area for
the distribution of his product. Also, he was now able to make better
use of the natural resource at his disposal. No longer was the sawmill
in Pennsylvania, for instance, forced to cut oak trees into lumber to be
used in home construction. For this purpose the carpenter was now able
to buy the softer,less expensive pine and spruce lumber being shipped
in from the New England states. This allowed the Pennsylvania lumberman
to mill his oak especially for the furniture manufacturer, thus realiz-
ing a greater profit.
As a result of these changes the early American lumber industry
began to take on its present form. By the early 1800's the industry
found itself ranked second among the nation's industries in respect to
size and importance. Only agriculture outdistanced the lumber industry.
Figures on the value of exports of the United States during the period
bear this out. From 1803 to 1815 the products of agriculture amounted
to eighty percent of all exports while the value of forest products was
second at eleven percent. Although it was a distant second, it is
significant to note that the percentage ranking of forest products ex-
ported exceeded the totals of all other manufacturing industries and of
f o hObo d 41S er1es com 1ne •
By 1800 a definite pattern of regional specialization had also taken
3lbidv II, pp. 27~28.
4N-ettels, Emergence of a National Economy, p. 277•.
8shape. In the South the lumber industry began to concentrate not only
on the manufacture of construction lumber for local consumption but also
on the production of naval stores. In the Middle Atlantic states the
main emphasis was placed on the processing of hardwood timber into fine
furniture lumber and other specialty products. Finally, in New England
the specialization took the form of the commercial lumber industry as
it was defined earlier in this paper: namely, the processing of timber
into lumber for general construction purposes. The forests of NeVI Eng-
·land were really the birthplace for the present day lumber industry as
it is now knoWn in the Pacific Northwest. It was in New England that
the early colonial lumbermen found the type of forest best suited to the
production of the lumber most in demand for general construction purposes.
Great stands of spruce and white pine were discovered. Both species
were of great commercial value because of their wide acceptance by the
buil~ing trade. In addition, the white pine was particularlY prized
for it wa.s this wood that was so much in demand bJ' the ship builders of
that period. The long, straight, limb-free trunks of th~ mature pine
trees were ideally suited for the superstructures and masts of the wooden
sailing vessels. ~\[ith a r!3-pidly expanding market for their ships the
American ship builders began to concentrate their yards along the
New England coast to take advantage of the accessibility of ~he white
pine. Naturally, the lumbermen were quick to follow suit in order to
satisfy this demand. 5
Thus, by the beginning of the nineteenth century the American
lumber industry had divided itself into distinct regions, and already
5Ibid ., p. 239.
9with.in the separate regions there was beginning to take place the pro-
cess of specialized concentration. Although it is impossible to ascribe
exact dates to such phenomenon, it is possible to make some approxima-
tion.~ In this respect it is probably safe to say that by 1800 the lumber
industry had entered into its second major stage of development. This
stage was to last until the Civil War period, some sixty years later.
There was more to this first great concentration of the lumber
industry than simply an apparently inexhaustible natural resource supply.
As stewart Holbrook points out in his delightful history of the American
logger, Holy Old. Mackinaw, conditions were perfect in New England in
general and in Maine in particular for the development of the industry.6
Not only were there great forests, but they were honeycombed with sev-
eral fine river systems, principally the Kennebec River and the Penob-
scot River. Besides being suitable for log transportation) these rivers
had the added feature of emptying i.nto the sea, making possible the needed
connections with the major trade areas of the eastern seaboard a.nd of the
rest of the world.
In Naine, near the mouth of the Penobscot, the town of Bangor
rapidly became the lumber capital of the world. Because- of the natural
conditions in Maine most of its early residents found their livelihood
in the pineries. For the first time in America's economic history a
given geographical region became dedicated almost completely·to the
production of ll®ber. Lumbering became the dominant and in some places
the sole industry in Maine during the period between 1776 and the Civil
6stewart H. Holbrook, Holy Old lvlackinavr (New York:' MacNillan,. 1938),
p. 14. .
10
\\far. The entire economies of many communities became shackled entirely
to the fortunes of lumber.
In this respect the labor force of the area was ideally suited to
the industry. Not only was this labor force ready and willing to help
Maine become the nation's top lumbering state, but they were also a most
able group of men. One of the key reasons the industry concentrated in'
Maine was the ability of Maine's lumbermen to come up with the necessary
technological advances. Naturally these first inventions were quite
elementary, but it is significant that several, such as the peavey and
the branding ax,'are stilJ. used by loggers today in their original form.
As business increased, so did the stature of Bangor. Ih time the
tmvn not only became a great lumbering center but also a great shipping
port. In its heyday Bangor beca~e the focal point, of a tremendous con-
centration of logs, lumber, and ships. It is probable that there were
almost as manY'fo~tunes made in shipping in Bangor during this time as
there were in the production of lumber. At times so many ships were
anchored in the Penobscot River at Bangor and neighboring to"ms up and
down the river a\vaiting their cargos of lumber that "small boys could
\'1alk across the harbor • • • on their decks."7 Ho:wever ,. jllSt as fast
as Bangor's star rose in the lumbering heavens, it was to descend.
Reaching its peak of lumber production in the 1830's through the early
1850 1S , the lumber industry in New England slowly began to show definite
signs of dwindling prosperity. The conditionQ which had seemed so favor-
able and which had promised such an infinite period of prosperity suddenly
changed. New England was to remain a major lumber producing region long
-------------,
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after it lost its place of prime inportance in the industry, but during
the deckde prior to the Civil Hal' several economic factors had combined
to move the main lumber industry elsewhere.
In examining the reasons for this shift in .geographical location
of the major portion of the industry, one begins to see an underlying
pattern of grmvth developing 'tfhich will become characteristic of the
lumb;er industry as it moves from region to region. From this basic
pattern or cycle of growth there developed many of the basic problems
of the industry, s::me of\vhich still pla,gue it today. To begin with, lJiaine' s
supposedly inexhaustible supply of timber was being rapidly exhausted.
The early industry put such a premium on perfect, defect-free lumber
that the loggers cut only the very best trees, leaving the less perfect
specimens to stand or lie in the woods. Thinking they could cut Maine's
prime timber forever, the eai"ly lumbermen gave no thought to reforestat~
ion. Cut-over land ltras left bare, to be taken over by marginal farmers
who attempted to gr01'f crops in a soil and in a climate suited primarily
to the gro1Arth of trees. As a result, by the. early 1860' s the resource
was depleted to the point where further lumber produ~tion on a large
scale was unprofitable.
Also, the lumber market was constantly changing. No longer was
the East Coast the only major domestic trade area. As the frontier
moved westward, the country1s population began to move into the Middle
Western states. To be sure, the eastern states remained heavy users
of lumber. The major metropolitanarea.s along the coast were still grow-
inga.t a rapid rate. New York City, for instance, by 1850 had attained
a population of 515,547. This represented an increase of some 800% over
12
its population of 60,489 in 1800,,8 The demand for lumber by the eastern
\
states certainly was not slacking. However, it was remaining rather
constant since the initial construction of homes and buildings in the
large cities had already taken place some years before. In contrast,
the cities, tmvns, and farms of the Midwest were still in their initial
phase of construction. In the Nidvlest during the 1800' s most construct-
ion ;was of new buildings, a.nd as a result it created a great demand for
;
lumber. The farmers, in particular, demanded vast amounts of lumber for
their many buildings and general farm uses, such as fencing, watering
an~ feed troughs, .cribbing, "\-lagon beds, etc. All of these, because of
hard use, had to be kept in 'constant repair, and the farmer was his o~m
carpenter. In this role he demanded improvements in lumber manufacturing
and in lumber· supply. For instance, hand split rails sufficed for fencing
only until the lumber mills could supply ·finished boards. The labor
saved by the farmer by. using the manufactlITed lumber could now be used
in the grm'iing of his crops. The relative inexpense of the manufac"!:'ured
lumber meant that the farmer could afford to fence more of his land. The
results were that the more lu.:rnber he got, the more the midwestern farmer
wanted. This demand, coupled with that of the constantly growing towns
and cities of the region, was insatiable.
These gains in demand more than offset. the loss experienced in
another major lumber market' of the day, that of the shipbuilding industryo
This 'industry, since colonial times a prime user of American 11D~ber,
began to experience a steady decline in the manufacture of \'looden vessels.
Su.s., Bureau of the Census, Seventh Census of the United states ~
1850 (Hashington: Robert Armstrong, 1853), p. Iii.
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Upon losing their colonial possessions in America, the major maritime
nations, particularly England, had gradually turned to the Scandinavian
countries for their lumber. After the Revolutionary War the slack in
foreign shipbuilding demands was taken up by domestic shipbuilding demands
as the United States built her own navy and merchant marine. 9 However,
by 1~60 the industry had caught up with the dernand. The advent of the
Merrimac and the Monitor heralded the end of the era of the wooden vessel.
Now the shipbuilders along the East Coast of the United States switched
to iron and steel, thus drying up a very large portion of the early demand
for lumber.
In answer to these changing conditions the lumber industry moved
into the white pine forests of the Upper Midwest. This first migration
was a natural one for the lumbermen, for in the forests of northern
Nichigan they found conditions almost identical to those which they had
experienced in New England. Again, it was a vast white pine forest
which appeared to be limitless and which held great profit possibilities."
9During the·latter part of the eighteenth century until the out-
break of the Revolutionary War Great Britain was the prime purchaser of
American built ships. At the beginning of the Revolution approximately
thirty percent (2,342 out of 7,694 ships) engaged in the commerce of
Great Britain were American built (Johnson, History of Domestic and For-
eign Comrnerce, I, p. 73) 0 After the war the demand o~ America.n shippers
and. of the American Navy·for American built ships steadily grew, event-
ually offsetting the lack of British demand. Construction was slow. until
1789 when Congress passed the Tonnage Act which gave protection to the
domestic shipbuilding industry and thus gave it the needed stimulus.
Construction had. reached a total of almost 100,000 tons by 1795, and
it averaged 110,000. tons a year during the good years of 1801-07. The
\'lar of 1812 caused a depressed market, but by 1815 the industry had
recovered enough to set a new record of 158,000 tons. This figure, when
compared with the total of 24,000 tons produced prior to the Revolution-
ary H"ar in 1769 is evidence that the "loss of British demand was no longer
being felt. (Nettels, Economic Hist.ory of the U.3~, p. 239) • -
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The available waterways and the closeness of the manufacturing centers
to the major trade centers of the area also were much the same as the
New England region. If anything 'vas different, it vTas the efficiency
of the lumbermen themselves. In Maine they had done their original
experimenting. In Michigan they could concentrate on improving these
earlier methods and machines. Logging and milli.ng technology began to
effect great changes in Imnber production. In Michigan the Saginaw
River and the town of SaginaVi quickly became the new center of lumber-
ing in the world. By 1875 Saginaw and surrounding tmms along the
Saginavi River 'vere blessed, or cursed, with 112 separate saw mills .10
Capable of cutting over a billion feet of lumber in a single season
with their ne"r steam-powered equipment, these mills far surpassed any-
thing Maine had to offer. By 1870 the value of the total lumber pro-
duction for 14.aine had declined to $11,395,747 v.Thich was approximately
5.5 percent of the total value of the nation's lumber production. In
contrast, ten years later !vIichigan's total production was valued at
$52,448,928, and the state accounted for 22.5 percent of the total
value of lumber production in the entire United states. ll At the height
of its lumber production period between 1870 and 1895 Hichfgan1s economy
took on much the same flavor as had that of lvIaine. Lumberl·ras king,
- .
and all other businesses in such communities as Saginaw, Bay City, and
1tIuskegon revolved entirely around the fortunes of lumber.
HO~Tever, the great advances in technology which-had made such suc-
10Holbrook, £Ioly Old NacktnaH, p. 84.
llU.S., Bureau of the Census, United states By Industries: Nan-
ufactures - 1905 (Washington: U.S. Government· Printing Office,' 1907), p. 162.
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cess possible were also among the chief causes for the decline of Nichigan
as the 'leading lumber producing state. The stemn driven saws in the mills
put constantly increasing pressures on the loggers in the woods to pro-
ducemore and more logs. Michigan reached its peak asa lumber producer
in 1890 when the total value of its lumber production was $83,121,969.12
The apPHrent health of the economy was deceiving. By 1890 the prime
whit;e pine forests of the state were practically gone, and in the years
i
which followed the producers had to settle for logs of poorer grade.
Production for Michigan slipped in value to $53,915,648 by 1900.13 The
mills of the Saginaw area were hit extremely hard. In fact, by 1895
only a handful of mills were still operating along the Saginaw River,
and even these were so hard pressed for an adequate log supply that
they w~re actually bringing logs to SaginaM from Canadian sources. How-
ever, this venture proved unsatisfactory, for the Canadian woods were
too far from the Saginaw mills to be profitable.
Conservation theories unfortunately had not kept pace with the
changes in methods a.nd equipment. The mistakes of 1-1aine were r~peated
in ~lichigan where the emphasis was also placed on short term profit.
Basically, there had been little or no attempt made in Michigan to re-
plenish the cut-over land. Conservation and profit seemed to be in-
compatible in the eyes of the lumbermen. Hith so m.any trees available,
the loggers saw no reason to be very scientific in their logging methods.
Only the choice, mature timber ·was sent to the mill, and the remaining
trees which failed to make the grade were either left standing or were
12Ibid •
l3Ibid.
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cut and left lying in the forest. Unlike the scientific method of·
selective logging which is now practiced in the pine regions of the
" West, this was a random, haphazard skimming off of the cream of the
timber crop while leaving the remainder of the resource to ·spoil. The
logged-over forests, when left to themselves, often became either the
starting points for insect and disease epidemics which threatened the
remaining timber or the sources for disastrous fires which often destroy-
ed many ac.res of choice timber in surrounding areas.
·These fires not only destroyed the standing timber .but sterilized
the soil to such an extent that it was often impossible to regenerate·
the forest imnediately. Fire, destroying the nitrogen content of the
already 101'[ fertility forest soil, lowers the soil fertility even more.
If seeds of the commercially valuable species, such as the pines or the
firs, do survive the fire, it is unlikely that they \-[ill take root in
the sterile soil. In their place "will come instead other species 6f
plants and trees which can exist under such conditions and which begin
the process of· building the soil to its former level. This cycle could
take severa.l hundred years. Only in cases such as Oregon's Tillamook
Burn, where seedlings have been transplanted by hand~ can the cycle be
broken and the mature forest be regenerated more quickly. The early
lumbermen of 1·1aine and the Upper Y..idwest gave no thought to such matters.
It was far easier and more in keeping with their short term profit mot-
ives to "cut out and get out. II "
At the· mill level there was likewise no thought given to conserva-·
tion. The sawmill waste burners 'iere aglow day and night as producers
cut for only the. higher grades of lumber. At the time the lower grades
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had little utility, and the mill mvners made no attempt to develop mar-
kets for the lower quality lumber or for lQmber cut from the so-called
w·eed species, such as Norway pine, jack pine, and hemlock. These "rere
considered waste and as such were often ~urned. The mills only multiplied
the unsound conservation practices of the loggers in the woods.
The earlier failures in conservation in Maine had failed to impress
upon the Michigan lwnbermen the need for a sound conservation program.
This lack of conservation on all levels more than offset the short term
prosperity of the lumber industry in Michigan. In less than ~ifty years
the lumbermen had cut themselves out of raw material, and Michigan lost
her claim to the lumber throne.
In analyzing this early period in the lumbering history of the
United States, it is interesting to note several things which are most
helpful in the understanding of the present status of the industry. The
industry's first great concentration in Maine and its first major migra-
tion westward to :Hichigan reveal a definite pattern which ~vas repeated
with each new migration. The practices of the early lwnbermen laid the
fotmdations for some of the basic problems which have plagued both the in-
dustry and the nation ever·since. The short term, high profit motive led
directly to the adoption of theflcut out and get out 11 policy which made
the lumbermen few friends. Their insistence on inm18diate profit made
them concentrate on satisfying only the areas of greatest demand, supply-
ing only the best of the resource. Little or no thought "ras given ·to the
possibilities of developing demands for the lower grades of lumber or
for the lwnber from the weed species. As a result, in both Haine and
Hichigan onlJr the prime spruce and pine \iere used. \ihile the remainder of
the timber was left in the woods or burned. This problem became more
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acute as new methods and machinery were developed in the industry.
vlith each new innovation the process of "cut out and get out 11 was ac-
celerated just that much more. Maine's industry lasted a relatively
long time compared to that of later regions. But by the time of the
industry's move to Michigan the process was so intense and swift that
Saginaw's prominence in the lumbering industry was relatively short
lived~ Whereas Bangor had enjoyed over one hundred years as a lumber
producer, Saginaw was to last only about sixty years and only during
the last twenty five of these years was Saginaw the country's leader
in lumber production. The end in the Saginaw area also came much more
abruptly. Hitting its peak production years in the 1870's and early
1880's, Saginaw vias completely through with large scale lu.mber product-
-ion by 1895.
The lumbermen had become their own worst enemy. The very things
that had made many of them wealthy were now bring adverse economic
effects to wide areas. The results of these practices were found in the
ghost towns, the depressed economic areas, and the lack of conservation
of one of the nation's basic resources. Saginaw in its prime as a lum-
bering center never exceeded a population of thirty thousand, and yet
it had a most vibrant economy, just as had Bangor during its prime.
The other lumber producin.g towns of Nichigan appeared to have the
same economic health. Yet, by 1895 and for many years to follow many
of these same towns in the lumber producing areas of Michigan had become
practically ghost tmms. The larger communities became economically
dormant, and their populations either remained stagnant or diminished
during the lean years of the late 1800 I S and early 1900 IS. As the f01-
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lowing chart shows, the population trends of the two leading lumber
centers, Saginaw and Bay City, were quite similar in these years:
TABLE 1
POPULATION TRENDS IN MICHIGAN
L~1BER CENTERS, 1890 - 1900 14
1890
Saginaw
Bay City
46,552
27,839
1900
42,345
27,628
In contrast, the tovms of southern ltichigan which were not dependent
on lwnber showed a constant population growth over this sanle ten year
period. Jackson and Kalamazoo, for instance, exhibited the following
trends:
TABLE 2
POPULATION TRENDS IN HICHIGAN
NON-LilllBERING TO~vNS, 1890 - 190015
Jackson
Kalamazoo
1890
20,798
17,853
1900
25,180
24,404
By 1910 the influx of the brand nell auto~obile industry had given some
tov~11S, such as Saginm·[, a new lease on life, but the smaller towns were
not so fortunate. The timberlands surrounding these towns were bare;.·
and the mills were either shut down completely or were operating at only
14u"S. ,. Bureau of the Census, Abstract of the Thirteenth Census: 1910 _
(\'lashi:hgton: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1913)., p. 64.
151, 'dOl •
20
a fraction of their capacity. The $83 million peak year for the Michigan
lumber industry in 1890 had dropped off drastically to $54 million by
1900~6 This drop of approximately thirty five percent foretold a bleak
future, and the operators began to take their capital elsewhere in hopes
of repeating the process which had proven so successful.
In doing so, they also forced the labor supply to move on. By
the time of the lumber industry1s Michigan exodus this labor force was
definitely at the mercy of the owners of the mills and the logging
companies. Largely unskilled and completely unorganized, they were
becoming nothing more than a transient labor force completely dependent
upon the whims of the operators. The majority of the loggers and sawrrdll
hands who made up this labor force knew no other trade. Not only was it
their life, but it had been the life of their fathers and grandfathers.
In addition to this association by birth with the lumbering life, most
men in the forest regions naturally took to the vigorous and often danger-
ous life in the woods or in the mills. Savrdust gradually got into their
veins, and once s~tten they could not break away. In becoming lumbermen,
even on the level of common labor, they too accepte4 the prevailing in-
dustry practice of constant movement. It was only reasonable that when
the trees were all cut the logging and mill operations viould have to
move on to the next stand of timber. If a man ~rished to keep working, he
too had to move on for there was usually no other market.for his labor
in the vacated town. The.westward movement of the industry dictated. the
westward movement of the labor force associated with lumbering, and as a
result. the lurr~er regions of ~tichigan and later Wisconsin and Minnesota
l6U.S• By Industries:· Nanufactures - 1905, p. 162.
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suffered untold econowic hardship.
The people liho decided to remain behind found little chance to
better their econornic positions since there was nothing to fill the
industrial void. In many cases people had to go on relief to exist.
Some communities, such as Saginaw, eventual~ found economic relief
with the coming of the automobile industry and other industries, but
many depressed areas of the Lake states remained unsolved economic
problems •. In describing this plight during the 1930's, Vernon Jensen
in his book, Lumber and Labor, traces the primary causes for the
economlc problems in these areas directly back to the migra.tion west-
ward of the lumber industry.
The relief problem in the cut-over area during the decade of the -
thirties was the most acute in any of the three Lake states. This
is definitely a result of unsolved problems of a decadent industry.
The recent - and in many cases ill-advised - settlement, the relat-
ive cultural heterogeneity of the region, the isolation, and the
depletion of the natural resources are all factors which helped
to produce the extremely high,relief rate and the meager standard
of living. The relief problem has been lIan agricultural one only
in that many of those usually employed in non-agricultural industry
had turned to agriculture after losing jobs -. • •• It ~Iore than one-
fifth of all the households on relief in June, 1935, consisted. of
persons living alone. "These were cases of former 'woodsmen or of
isolated individuals who had settled on a piece of land or ina
village in the Cut-Over Area when .the timber had been cut. n In
addition, unemployabilit;y has been more serious in this ,'r'egion
than in other parts of these states. liThe area contains' an usually
high proportion of elderly unattached men; former lumberjacks •• •• 11
The depression simply revealed the effects of.the ~ong-declining.
lumber industry and the failure to do anything sufficiently con-
structive to solve the many problems it left behind.l?
However, in the middle and late 1800's little heed was given to
these ominous signs~ Toward his almost captive labor force the mill
owner's cttitude was hardly benevolent. Long, hard work in the woods
-~------'--- -----------'--,
1'1Vernon H. Jensen, Lumber and Labor (Ne'v'l York: Farrar & Rinehart,
Inc., 1945), p. 67.
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or in the ~tlls was rewarded with poor pay and even poorer working con-
ditions. labor, being lillorganized and lacking a favorable barrpining
position in respect to having other job opportlli~ities available, was
unable to retaliate. In regard to the natural resource, the future
timber supply was merely taken for granted both by the ITh~bermen and
by the American public. The feeling on the part of the genera.l public
during the latter part of the nineteenth century \vas that the main con-
cern should be to use the timber inrrnediately to build the nation and
let the future take care of itself. vlith this favorable attitude on
the public's part, the lumbermen faced little oppositon a.s they placed
more and more errlphasis on the profit motive, and the successful operator
gave little thought to the exploitative nature of the means he was using
to attain his personal ends. The ends justified the means. After all,
there had always been and would always be another inexhaustible stand
of timber, bigger and better than the last stand, just waiting over the
next hill.
CHAPTER II
The forests of northern Wisconsin and northern Minnesota were
the next stop for the hungry lumbermen. Actually, the development of
the lumber industry in the Upper Mississippi Valley regions took place
almo~t concurrently with that of the industry in Michigan. With the
decline of Saginm-r as a major lumber producer in the 1880 rs, the impetus
shifted first to Wisconsin and then to Vdnnesota, and by 1890 the new
center of the industry was located in and around the northern Minnesota
town of Cloquet. Situated a short way up the St. Louis River from
~Jluth, the heavy concentration of sawmills in and around Cloquet were
in time to make it the last great lumber center of the Midwest. l
To understand why this second migration took place, it is not
enough to know what caused the decline of the industry in Michigan. One
must also examine the economic conditions in the Upper Midwest during
this period, for important changes were taking place between 1850 and
1900 in the economy of this region which greatly affected the develop-
ment of the lumber industry in the Upper ~tississippi Valley. Of prime
importance was the tremendous increase in population in the Midwest. The
fertile, plentiful, and inexpensive farm lands of the Midwest coupled
with equally attractive economic opportunities in the growing towns and
cities of the region acted as a magnet drawing .an ever increasing surge
of population westward. This population gr01vth was particularly signifi--
1
Ralph W. Hidy, Frank E. Hill, and Allen Nevins, Timber and Men:
The We~erhaeuser sto~ (New York: Macmillan, 1963), pp.-188-204. Also,
see Holbrook, Holy Old Nackinaw, pp.117-18.
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cant in those states along the Upper 1'lississippi River, as is shovm by
the following chart:
TABLJ~ 3
POPULATION TRENDS IN THE STATES
BORD~nING THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI
1850 - 19002
Approx. Percent-
1850 1900 age Increase
Illinois 851,470 4,821,550 570~0
Iowa 192,211~ 2,231,853 ·1,160;b
llinnesota 6,077 1,750,394 2,920;&
Vlisconsin 305,391 2,069,042 6807;
vfith this growth in the market there naturally came a great increa.se in
lumber demand. In addition to this increase in demand on the part of the
individual consumers there was also at this time a tremendous increase
in lumber orders from the railroads. This period between 1850 and 1900
was the peak time for railroad expansion. During the twenty years fronl
1870 to 1890 the total railroad ndleage of the nation jumped from a
meager 52,922 miles to a total of 166,703 miles. 3 Although nationwide
in scope, a large percentage of this increase was in the Hidwest, In
the areas immediately adjacent to the lumber regions of the Upper 1JIid-
west this increase in railrop.d mileage "ras most significa1!t to the great
increase in lumber production.
2U.S., Bureau of the Census, Statistical Atlas of the United States: .
1900 (\Iashington: U.S. Governr,1ent Printing Office, 1903), Plate 19.
3u.s., Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of the United
States: 1901 (l/iashin-gton : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1902), pp. 390-
91.
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TABLE 4
INCREASE IN RAIlROAD4MIlEAGE, 1870 - 1890
Group I 14,701 miles
(Ohio, Nichigan, Indi-
ana, Illinois, and
Wisconsin)
Group II 5,004 miles·
(Iowa, ltinnesota, North
Dakota, South Dakota,
Nebraska, Nontana, and
\vyoming)
1880
25,l09.miles
12,347 miles
1890
36,976 miles
27,294 miles
Of these particular states show'll in Table J+ only 1~isconsin and Minn-
esota possessed the necessary softwood timber resources needed to supply
the demands of the railroads for lumber. The close proximity of the for-
ests of Wisconsin and ~linnesota to the major railroad construction areas
and to the principal railroad equipment manufacturing centers, coupled
with the relatively easy transportation to these markets afforded by the
Mississippi River and the railroads themselves naturally made the lumber-
men of the Upper }tississippi Valley the logical suppliers of this great
demand.
This tremendous increase in railroad building had far-reaching effects
on the lumber industry of the Upper Middle West. Initially, this expansion
meant an unbelievable number of ties, trestles, and buildings. 5 But once
4Ibid.
~The lumber demand of the railroads during the period from 1870 to
.1890 is staggering. For example, the lumbet' consumed just for railroad
ties during this period represents a major share of the lumber industry1s
total output. Figuring railroad ties at t\'lO foot intervals, the. 113,781
miles of trackage built during this twenty year period represents approx-
imately 300,381,840 ties. Figuring each tie at eight inches by eight inches
. ~.
26
this demand for lumber was satisfied, the equally large lumber require-
ments for the great increase in railroad rolling stock which followed
put continued pressure.on the lumber industry of the Upper :Hississippi
Valley. Consisting almost entirely of wood above their carriage system,
these early railroad cars required lumber not only for framing but also
for flooring, siding, roofing, and interior finish. So great was the
influence of the railroads on the lumber market that yet today the term
"car siding" prevails in the lumber industry in reference to several
patterns of siding even though steel has long since replaced lumber as
the siding material for most railroad cars. 'l'his great demand for lumber
by the railroad car manufacturers was directly proportional to the great
increases in the numbers of railroad cars being built at the turn of the
century. Table 5 on the following page clearly shows this increase.
Another significant fact which greatly influenced the lumber in-
.dustry of the Upper Midwest was that some of the nation's major railroad
car manufacturers located their plants in cities easily accessible to
the lmnber which they needed so badly. Chicago and St. Louis quickly
became leaders in this industry. Chicago's Pullman Company and the
American Car Company of St. Louis by 1880 had become the largest man-
by seven feet, this number would equal approximately 11,114,128,080
board feet of lumber. In comparison, this amount of footage would build
some 733,333 homes, the average home containing approximately 15,000
board feet of lumber!
Some of these ties were produced locally, but the vast majority
of them came from the mills in the Upper Midwest and were shipped to
other parts of the nation. The coniferous species of the northern states
were much more suited to such uses than were the hardwood species of the
Nidwestern and l-'Iiddle Atlantic. states where railroad growth was most
pronounced. The conifers·were easy to work, produced longer lengths
of lumber, held their manufactured shape better when exposed to the
elements, and grmv in greater volu.rn8 per tree than the hardwoods.
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ufacturers of railroad cars in the United States. 6 These industrial
centers naturally relied on the lumber industry of the Upper Mississippi
Valley as their primary lumber resource.
TABLE 5
INCREASE IN RAIL.B.OAD CARS
1887 - 19007
1887
Group I
(Ohio, Nichigan, Indi-
'ana, Illinois, and
.Jiisconsin )
1900
Number of:
Passenger cars
Baggage, Nail, et c •
Freight
Group II
(Iowa, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Minn-
esota, Montana, Ne-
braska, and Wyoming)
Number of:
Passenger cars
Baggage, Nail, etc.
Freight
The Fntire United States
Number of:
Passenger cars
Baggage, Nail, etc.
Freight
4,297
1,888
291,347
935
447
55,793
20,582
6,592
956,631
4,842
1,970
325,027
1,321
537
77,276
23,083
7,368
1,110,286
6,522
2,424
432,699
1,626
571
112,752
26,786
8,209
1,350,258
6Stewart H. Holbrook, The Age of the Moguls (New York: ermin, 1947),
pp. 117-18.
7U.S., Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract' of the U.S.: 1901
(Washington: U.S. Goverrunent Printing Office, 1902), p.392. Also, see
U.S", Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of the U.S.: 1894 (1rlash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1895), p.307. The amount of
lumber us'ed in these cars "Tas overwhelming. ' The dimensions of a standard
freight car of the period \-Jere ten feet in height by nine feet in l'lidth'
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The ltunber demands of the nation1s railroads at this time in
our history rnore than filled the void created by the decline of the
wooden shipbuilding industry. The manufacture of wooden sailing ves-
sels reached its peak in 1855 when a total of 510,690 tons were built.
In contrast, by' 1889 the production for the industry had dwindled to a
·meager 71,816 tons.8
Not only 'Ala.s the demand there, but also the supply or at least the
necessary raw material was close at hand. The great white pine forests
of northern Wisconsin and northern ~tinnesota far exceeded the lumber-
men's wildest dreams. However, the lumbermen now began to have certain
doubts about their industry in respect to the changing and increasing.
demands for their product. True, the industry by 1890 lias well estab-
lished in the Upper Hidviest. The concentration of logging operatfons
and savmrl.lls in the. Upper Nissis~ippi 'Valley by this date rivaled the
magnitude of the previous concentrations along the Saginaw or the Penob-
scot, and it was reasonable to assume that these new lumbering operat-
ions could satisfy the great increase in demand. \fuat began to cause
concern among various ltunbermen was the problem of making the most of
the opportunity using the traditional methods of the industry. Saw-
mills were still independent and generally operated on a relatively
by thirty six feet in length. Eliminating from consideration all lumber
used for framing, bracing, and trim, the total footage per car of the
·two inch ltunber used for flooring and the one inch stock used for siding
and roofing 1,<fas approximately_2,OOO board feet. The total amount of
siding, roofing, and flooring consumed in the 1,350,258. freight cars in
existence in 1900 would be approximately 2,700,516,000 board feet of
lumber! (Francis E. Lister, The Car Builder's Dictionary (New York:
T!Ie Railroad Age Gazette, 1909), pp.66~67.)
8U.5. ,. Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of the U.S.: 1889'
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1890), pp.206-08.
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small scale. Few, if any, mills owned their own timber, preferring-
instead to purchase logs from the various independent logging companies.
Most recognized the fact that their survival depended upon controlling
their log supply, yet few of the Mississippi mill owners had sufficient
financial resources to insure an indefinite flow of logs into their mills.
Furthermore, mistrust and competition among them was so great that any
cooperative effort in respect to acquisition of stumpage or to' long term
arrangements with the logging contractors seemed remote. As Freder-
ick E. Weyerhaeuser, the son of the man who was to eventually bring
order -to the confusing situation, observed, "l-lany (lumbermen) of the
Mississippi Valley • • • were ready to fight one another upon the slight-
est pretext • • •• There \,[as little if any spirit of co-operation .119
This mistrust and competition was in evidence in other areas of
the lumber business. For instance, at the mill level each mill attempted
to captUre its share of t?e market by manufacturing lumber according to
its own specificati~ns. The theory was tha.t once a customer started to
buy the product of a particular mill, the uniqueness of the sizes, pat-
terns, B.nd grades v'fould insure repeat business. The result was almost
complete 'confusion • The Northv,restern Lumberman_, a trade journal of the
period, noted the "Babelic confusion" which seemed to prevail in lumber
manufacturing practices.' Concerning the initial attempts to standard-
ize lumber grades throughout the nation's entire lurnber industry, it
remarked that these rules had been "so kicked,cuffed, knocked, and
mutilated that the fond parents of the system (the lumbermen) would
9Hidy, Hill, and Nevins, Timber and Hen, p.42.
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not know their own offspring. IIIG
In wholesaling the products of the mills the story was much the
same. Being small and independent placed a definite restriction on the
possibility of having company salesmen traveling the countryside selling
to the retail lumber dealers and to the large industrial accounts. In-
stead, sales efforts were for the most part carried on by expensive,
independent wholesale brokers in metropolitan areas, such as Chicago q
At best, the sales situation was chaotic.
Vlith this independence, confusion, and extreme competition at all
levels. of the industry it was small wonder that only a few lumbermen
along the Upper Mississippi were really benefiting to the maximum from
the seerningly ideal economic conditions of the time and locale. However,
the lumber industry of the period was not alone in being faced with such
a predicament. In.many industries at this time in our history following
the Civil War the same situation existed. Technological advances and
market conditions exposed unlimited possibilities, but existing conditions,
business structures, and business practices were not such as to take
advantage of these opportunities. It was at this moment in the history
of the United states that into the center of the economic stage stepped
the small group of men who seemed to possess the qualifications needed
for leadership in this nmo[ era of American business. -Gone were the days
when the business world was dominated by the single proprietor or the
simple partnership. In their places of leadership came the so-called
moguls, heading the large corporations whose business outlook and sphere
lOThe Northwestern Lumberman, September 24, 1881, p.21, as quoted
by Hidy, Hill, and Nevins, Timber -and lolen, p. 175.
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of influence were national and often international in scope. Each
major indust.ry, whether it were oil, railroads, banking, chemicals,
mining, or food processing had during the latter half of the nineteenth
century certain individuals or small groups of men who were instrument-
al in the consolidation and expansion of the given industry v.Thichevent-
ually placed it in the category of UBig Business."ll Lumber was no
exception, for it was at precisely this ti..1lle that the young German
immigrant, Frederick Weyerhaeuser, began to build his vast kingdom.
The vleyerhaeuser interests have dominated the lumber scene- so much
during the last one hundred years that an:JT study of the industry v-rould
be incomplete without using Weyerhaeuser and his organization.as a pri-
mary point of reference.
Of all the great business moguls of the late l$OOls and early
1900's few, if any, still today carry an air of mystery like that which
surrounds the Weyerhaeuser name and fortune. Generally speaking, these
men created their empires in full or at least partial view of the pub-
lie. ~fuat they tried to hide from the public more often than not shO\ved
up in the form of their ornate homes, their yachts, or other pleasures.
Only occasionally during the period of the rise of big business in the
United States was a man able to amass a fortune in secrecy. For in-
stance, Holbrook in The Ageoi' the Moguls tells about Andrew Mellon and
how he was able to build his lortune practically unnoticed. 12 However,
when Hellon becaTIle Secretary of the Treasury in the 20 1s, his background
llHarold U. Faulkner, The Decline of Laissez Faire (New York: Rine-
hart and Co .. , 1951), pp. 153=6"1.
l~Iolbrook, The Age of the Hoguls, pp. 212-30.
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became general public knm'lledge. By the 1930 I S enough had been \'lritten
about the Rockefellers, the Fords, the Carnegies, tDe Vanderbilts, and
the other giants of American industry so that their names and lives
were knmvn to almost everyone. Not so with Weyerhaeuser. Outside of
the lwnber industry few people could pronounce his nanle, let alone
spell it. He was virtually unYJlown, and. yet in 1907 there appeared,
to the surprise of the general public, a magazine article proclaiming
Frederick Weyerhaeuser to be richer than even the acknowledged king of
wealth, John D. Rockefeller. 13
'Until 1963 there was little published material. available con-
cerning the history of Weyerhaeuser and the grm'lth of his lumber em-
pire. Nany of the standard books written on the early industrial leaders
of America fail to even mention \1eyerhaeuser' s name, and those that do
mention it only in passing and in a very superfic~almanner" Holbrook
in The Age of the Moguls says nothing of the Weyerhaeuser interests.
Josephson also fails to rnake note of Weyerhaeu~er in his book, The
Robber Barons.14 Myers in his History of the Greatft.merican Fortunes
devotes only four pages to Weyerhaeuser, and this only because of the
connection between Weyerhaeuser and James Hillis Northern Pacific Rail-
road. 15 It was not until late in the 1950's that certain officials of
D. . ..C.P. Norcross, "Richer Than Hockefeller - ~\feyerhaeuser", Cosmo-
politan, ·Janua.ry, 1907, as quoted by Roy E. Appleman, "Timber Empire
From the Public Domain ll , 1-'Iississ:i.ppi Valley Historical Reyiew, September
1939, XXVI, No.2, p. 208. .
14NathevIJosephson, The Robber Barons (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co.,
1934) •
15Gustavus Hyers, History of the Great .American Fortunes (New York:
Random House, Inc., 1936), pp. 689-92.
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the VJeyerha.euser orga.n~zation proposed that the complete. history of-
the Company be written. The result of this proposal was published in
1963 under the title of Timber and Men: The Weyerhaeuser Storz. Its
co-authors are Ralph Hidy, Frank Hill, and Allen Nevins. These men
have done exhaustive research of their subject, and yet even this work
leaves several important questions unans1vered. Although in the intro-
duction of the book the authors claim "absolute independence lf and com-
plete freedonl of thought and although Weyerhaeuser Company officials
deny any company subsidy for the study, it is obvious after reading
the book and in drawing upon personal knmvledge of the ~le~ierhaeuser
history that the book does reflect a very favorable attitude toward
the dompany and its early policies, and at several points in the book
the authors fail to present the complete story of important events in
the firm' shistoF.1.' The complete understanding of some of these events,
such as the acquisition of timberlands from the railroads, is most im-
portant to the understanding of the development of the entire lumber
industry, particularly in the Pacific Northwest. Much of the information
for this book vias gathered from direct conversations with present ~veyer~
haeuser officials and family members, and, as the authors admit in
their ackn01'lledgments, F.K. Weyerhaeuser, who was chairman of T;Ieyerhaeuser's
board of directors at the time the book was published~ even helped in
proof reading the final work. For these reasons one can not place com-
plete reliance in some of the material presented in Timber and }~en but
must look elsewhere to find the complete story. Nevertheless, Timber
and Hen is a long overdue account of the vJeyerhaeuser empire and its
role in the development of the lumber industry. Along with company
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publications it is a valuable source of information for a study of the
Weyerhaeuser organization as it reflected the development of the entire
lUmber industry during the past one hundred years.
The significance of vleyerhaeuser is that he became the main force
beh:i.nd the consolidation and coordination of the early lumber interests
in the Upper Mississippi River Valley and later in the Pacific North-
west. His early history is one of. steady progression to a position of
wealth and influence. He came to the United States from his native
Germany in 1852 at the age of seventeen, and after a series of jobs and
moves he eventually settled in Rock Island, Illinois, which at that time
was a center of lumber manufacturing on the Mississippi. He worked at
the Nead, Smith, and 14arsh sawmill in Rock Island for a time as a gen-
eral laborer and' then advanced to the position of manager of one of the
firm1sretail Ituuber yards. The sawnri.ll went bankrupt in the Panic of
1857, however, Weyerhaeuser had demonstrated his managerial abilities
to such an extent that the creditors decided to allow him to continue
operation of the retail yard. Although he lvas only twenty-tvlo at this
time and had worked for Mead, Smith, and Harsh for only a year and a
half before the firm went bankrupt, Weyerhaeuser showed .his full manager-
ial abilities in his new position for even though money was scarce he
was able to build his credit through the simple yet sometimes complicated
process of barter. He soon was able to purchase the retail lumber yard
himself, and in 1860 Weyerhaeuser and his brother-in-law, F.C.A. Denk-
mann, formed a partnership and purchased thesavnnill itself along with
other assets of the former lumber firm •
.During the next feH years Heyerhaeuser and Denkrnann Company pros-
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pered to the extent that \'Jeyerhaeuser was able to expand his horizons
by an initial purchase of 840 acres of timber along \fisconsin's Chip-
pmva River on December 14, 1870.16 In his trips up and down the 1v'lis-
sissippi and into the logging regions of Wisconsin he came into contact
with the leaders of the various segements of the industry. His trips
and experiences also exposed him to all of the wasteful methods and to
all of the ruthless and sometimes shady practices which individual
operators w"ere resorting to in o~der to make a showing. Weyerhaeuser
reasoned that if the leading men of the Upper }tississippi Valley lumber
industry could somehow unite and reconcile their differences and con-
flicting interests, all would benefit. Others had attempted such co-
operative ventures in the past but had failed, but Weyerhaeuser felt
that the time was ripe for another attempt at organization.
One such area of conflict was centered around the right to dri.ve
logs on the Chippewa River in Wisconsin. Since most of the local mill
mvners in and around the towns of Eau Claire and Chippewa Falls had
their "own loggine crews in the woods, the independent logging firms
located in the forests of the Chippewa River basin had to sell their cut
primarily to the mills below Eau Claire, particularly to those located
on the Mississippi River. The mill owners of Eau Claire and Chippewa
Falls resented and resisted this attempt of their competition to drive
the Chippe\va. Their objections were based primarily on the reasoning
that these drives were creating obstacles and hazards to the local ~all
operations. Occasional log jams and broken log booms caused by run away
logs ""ere given as evidence of this danger. " Also, the "lumbermen of the
16Hidy, Hili, and Ne;ins, Timber an~en, p.50.
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Upper Chippewa argued that only finished goods should be allowed to
leave the state. The log drives of the Mississippi mills would strip
Wisconsin of her raw materials, and in doing so the economy of the state
would suffer accordingly. Because of these objections the local ~ill
owners constantly harassed the log drives of their down-river competitors
by blockading the river and diverting the logs into their own booms,
thus!delaying the drive and imposing additional hardships on the Mis-
sissippi mills, which were eagerly awaiting their logs.17
To solve the blockades imposed by the Upper Chippewa Imnbermen, a
group of the independent timber m1ners and logging concerns organized
in 1867 the Beef Slough 1-1anufacturing, Booming, Log Driving, and Trans-
portation Company. Its purpose was to facilitate the driving of logs.
past Chippewa Falls and Eau Claire into the Beef Slough at the mouth of
the Chippewa River. Once in the boom works constructed in the Slough the
logs could then be rafted for the journey down the }lississippi.
Hmvever, the Upper Chippe~ra mill owners by legal action. and by .
outright physical action continued to be successful in their efforts to
stop the Beef Slough Company from ~ompleting their drives. In regard to
the legal aspect ,the Chippewa Falls-Eau Claire group 1vas able to bring
sufficient lobbying pressure to bear upon the Wisconsin legislature,
which had the pmver to grant the concession to navigate the state rs
rivers, and the awarding of the concession on the Chippe1va River was
delayed long enough to insure bankruptcy for the new concern.
To e.ugment their efforts at the legislature, the mill owners con-
17Robert F. Fries, liThe Mississippi River Logging Co. and the Struggle
for the Free Navigation of Logs II, Nississippi Valley Hi.storical Review,
Dece~mber 1948, XXXV, No.3, p.430.
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tinued their direct delaying tactics. Each spring brought a new drive
and a new battle to see if the logs would pass Eau Claire or would pause
for a month or longer in their journey dmvn to the }lississippi. The
lumbermen of the Upper Chippewa gained their biggest physical victory
in the spring of 1868 when they successfully diverted and held in their
booms through June the entire drive for which the Beef Slough Company
had contracted. This amounted to approximately 50 million board feet
18
of logs. As a result of these delaying tactics the Beef Slough firm
was on the verge of bankruptcy by 1870.
The impending failure of this concern meant that the ~lississippi
mill owners, none of whom had been involved in the Beef Slough Company,
would be cut off from their most promising supply of' logs. By 1870
the timber in the Chippewa basin held the key to the continued prosperity
of the Vrlssissippi sawmills, for by this time the timber ~eserves of
vlisconsin's other river basins, primarily the lJ"isconsin River and the
Black River, were claimed and fairly well logged over. Not so with the
Chippewa. There was plenty of choice timber either unclaimed or in the
hands of holders who were willing to sell the stumpage at the right priceo
Cornell University, for instance, by 1867 O\'med 499,126 acres of prime
timberland along the Chippewa .19 If the Nississippi mill mmers could
find a solution to the Chippewa blockade, they could have access to this
timber. Hov-rever, felt! of them "rere willing to ta.ke the steps a.nd the
risks to alleviate the problem, feeling that the investment was too great
for any individual mill to handle. Heyerhaeuser thought differently, and
l8!bid., pp. 431-34.
19Hidy, H~ll, and Nevins, Timber and.Hen, p. 43.
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in association with Lorenzo Schricker and Elijah SWift, who were also
lumbermen operating along the If.tississippi, he leased the nearly ba.nk-
rupt Beef Slough Company on November 1, 1870. This venture was follow-
ed by the formulation of the ~dssissippi Logging Company in December of
the same year. 20 This latter firm included other mill m'mers along the
Vussissippi, and by pooling their financial resources in a cooperative
effort, they were able, after a long legal battle, to gain the right to
drive the Chippewa. Of even greater significance was the fact that
these two concerns were the beginnings of the giant Weyerhaeuser syn-
dicate which by 1900 ruled the nation's softwood lumber industry froni
coast to coast 0
The members of these original Weyerhaeuser organizations soon
found that their personal fortunes were greatly increased by the pool-
ing of their individual resources, abilities, and interests. To begin
with, waste in the form of unprofitable logging practices could now be
eliminated. Formerly, the patchwork nature of timberland ownership had
mad.e logging difficult if not at times almost impossible. ~\fith differ-
ent sections of land o~med by different owners the loggers had to respect
property rights which often hindered their production. 1\~en the neces-
sary right-of-v.rays were refused, the loggers had to restrict their log-
ging to available tracts of timber, which might be vridely separated.
By joining either or both of the t1'TO boom companies, the l-Ussissippi
lumbermen and the logging concerns in the ~v'isc'onsin woods eliminated
thi.s problem. All timberland along the Upper Chippewa and its tribu-
taries oltmed by the members of the syndicate became common property, at
20Ibid ., pp. 50--52.
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least for the sake of logging. The loggers thus could log this coWmon
property without respect to property rights. The result was greater
production at less expense. Timber was cut and all logs were sent dovffi
the Chippewa to Beef Slough. It was here, not in the woods, that the
logs were sorted and graded. \'1hen this was done, the logs were divided
according to species, size, and grade by pre-arranged percentages. They
were.' then rafted, and the rafts towed down the JvIississippi to their re-
i
spective millers. The significance of this arrangement was that it
relieved the mill ovmers of worry over their log supply. Logs now
would come to the mills in a constant and definite flmV', and each mill
could concentrate all of its efforts on processing the logs.
During the entire period of growth in the vTisconsin area, Frederick
\'leyerhaeuser was the "driving spirit" behind the Nississippi lumbermen.
Although the struggle over river rights on ·.the Chippewa was to continue
until 1881, the associations begun primarily through Weyerhaeuser's
efforts in 1870 and which eventually encompassed three quarters of the
sawmilling investments betvreen ~1inona, Iv1innesota and St. Louis, lvIissouri,
soon began to show the necessary cohesiveness and unity of purpose
needed to insure an ultimate victory for the Ivlississippi mll owners. 21
ay 1873 Weyerhaeuser had fourteen' associates united with him to fight
the battle~of the Chippewa. All of these men and the firms they repre-
sented remained as individual units, surrendering only that portion of
their sovereignty vrhich was required by the new corporation. liThe
,company (lvlississippi River Logging Company) combined cooperation with
pungent individualism. No firm surrendered one iota of control over
21Fries, "The l'lississippi River Co.", pp. 434-35.
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its manufa.cturing or sales. Yet with a common objective, and under the
leadership of Frederick vleyerhaeuser, they became an effective team for
buying, driving, and sorting logs.,,22 Entering into the association
strictly to protect their individual business interests, the Mussers,
.the Lambs, the Lairds, the Nortons, theWeyerhaeusers, and the others
in time found friendships growing and eventually replacing former feel-
ings of mistrust. Later generations of these faRdlies were to inter-
marry, cementiI1:g theo_. bonds even more permanently. 23
During this entire period of grov~h in the Wisconsin area,
Weyerhaeuser was the guiding force, but still he manipulated his busi-
ness ventures without publicity or public awareness. In 1891 he moved
his residence from Rock Island to st. Paul, ~linnesota and thus entered
into another phase of his career. By this time the center of the lumber
industry had shifted from Wisconsin to Minnesota with the major con-
centrat ion being in the Cloquet area. Once again the story was the same.
Minnesota became in time a repetition of the earlier success of \'Jeyer-
haeuser in Illinois and Wisconsin. By buying up tracts of virgin white
pine timberlands, by gaining control of manufacturing operations around
the major lumber centers such as Cloquet and Still\'later, and by further
consolidation of their interests the Weyerhaeuser group grew rapidJy.
In the region north of Minneapolis and St. Paul the evergreen
22Hidy, Hill, and Nevins, Timber and Men, p. 53.
-23Even today these eurly associations are evident in the names of
many current Heyerhaeuser Company officials. Probably the best and most
obvious example is that of Norton Clapp, until recently the president of
the company. Mr. Clapp can trace his origins back to Nathew G. Norton,
one of the original fii.ssissippi River Logging Company partners ,and to
N.H. Clapp, the legal advisor to and an eventual partner in the early
\veyerh~eus'er operations (Hidy, Hill, and Nevins, Timber and ~Ien, p. 328).
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forests covered a greater area than had those of Wisconsin before they
had been depleted by the lwnbermen. vleyerhaeuser made his initial venture
into this area in 1890 when he and others of his associates formed the
Pine Tree Lumber Company and purchased 212,722 acres of timberland on
the Upper lvIississippi watershed from the Northern Pacific Railroad for
24-$452,330. This was part of the land grant given to the Northern
Pacific, and it represented the first of several large timberland trans~
actions between the railroad and the Weyerhaeuser syndicate.
With the incorporation of the Pine Tree Lumber Company and its
initial timberland purchase, Heyerhaeuser embarked upon the first phase
of a two part exploitation of Minnesota's forests. Locating the manu-
facturing facilities of Pine Tree at the tovnl of Little Falls, Minnesota,
they were able to take advantage of the excellent transportation pos-
sibilities afforded by the Mississippi River not only in bring logs to
the mill but in-.shipping the finished lumber downriver to }tIinneapolis
and St. Paul. Prospects vlere encouraging enough to warrant the crea---
tim of another corporation in 1893. The Nississippi River Lumber Company
was established with the intention of setting up a second manufacturing
unit to process the timber of the Upper Mississippi watershed. However,
due to the general economic depression which developed in 1893, this plan
never materialized, and the Mississippi River Lumber Company spent its
entire existence as a timber and logging company, acquiring timberland,
logging- the timber, and selling the logs to the Pine Tree Lumber Company
and also later to the Northland Pine Company, the final member of the
Weyerhaeuser triumvirate in central Minnesota. Northland Pine, incor-
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porated in 1899, vlith milling facilities located in }/Iinnea.polis, in
reality was the manufacturing unit intended to be integrated with the
~lississippi River Lumber Company.
None of thes.e three ventures \Vas to last. Pine Tree Lumber Com-
pany had by far the longest life,ending its lwnber production and ship-
ment in 1920, thirty years after its creation. Northland Pine likewise
closed its mill in 1920, being the last Minneapolis mill to shut dmm,
thus signaling an end to a distinct period of that city's development.
However, within the relatively short span of existence of all three
companies Weyerhaeuser and his associates were quite handsomely rewarded.
According to Timber and Nen,
The three v[eyerhaeuser lumber companies operating in central Minneqota
had all been successful in carrying through their undertakings, and
all profited on a more than generous scale. ~ 1922 Pine Tree, which
almost twenty years earlier had paid all its debts and returned 100
percent on the original invested capital, had paid its stock holders
an additi~nal $11,463,395. Up to 1910 the rtisslssippi River Lumber
Co. paid no dividends, but during the next eight years distributed
$3,958,750 - more than twice the original investment. Northland
declared dividends totaling almost $1,000,000 by 1903, and between
1908 and 1925 paid out $6,900,000 more, largely reflected in the
earning statements of its two pCl..rent corporations. 25
The other main, Minnesota venture of Weyerhaeuser was even more
successful and more significant. BY 1890 the forests bordering Lake Su-
perior and those within the watershed of the st. Louis River represented
over half of the remaining white pine timber in Minnesota. Weyerhaeuser
realized that the region held great potential, and although at the time
he was deeply involved in pursuing his interests in central 1'1innesota, he
seized several opportunities to become involved in the growing lumber
industry in the northeastern corner of the state.
25Ibid ., p. 138.
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His first opportunity came in 1883-84. The Knife Falls Lumber
Company of Cloquet was experiencing financial difficulty and was forced
to dispose of its holdings. Weyerhaeuser became involved when he loaned
the organization $25,000. To protect his money, he eventually was able
to instigate the sale of the concern to a group of Davenport, Iowa,
lumbermen led by George S. Shaw. In 1884 a new corporation was formed
under the name of Renwick, Shmv, a.nd Crosett Company, and the sale was
I
!
consummated. For his troubles and for his $25,000 loan \1eyerhaeuser
and his brother-in-law, F.C.A. Denkmann, received 250 shares of stock,
which was approximately fifteen percent of the total number of shares
distributed. 26 This was the start of the reign of Weyerhaeuser over
the Cloquet lumbering scene, a reign which in a few short years would
control all major processing units in the town and dominate almost
completely the Cloquet economy.
The Renwick, Shaw, and Crosett Company became the Cloquet Lumber
Company in 1886 and by 1889 it was firmly established as one'of the
region's major lumbering concerns. Although George Shaw remained the
principal stockholder, Frederick Weyerhaeuser's influence in the company
grew rapidly. In 1885 he was selected vice president of the firm and
held this office until 1897 when he became president. During this per-
iod the company's success was reflected both in the profit it made for
its owners and in the growth of the company's physical plant. Cloquet
Lumber Company began almost immediately to pay handsome dividends to
the stockholders, including eight percent payments in both 1886 and in
1890. These,' coupled \'lith several steck dividends, greatly enhanced the
26Ibid ., p. 117.
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wealth of the principals. As for the physical property of the concern,
its continued grrnvth led to the purchase of an additional mill site in
1889, and by 1892 the capitalization of the firm had reached $1,000,000,
more than three times the original amount. 27
Weyerhaeuser and his associates launched their second Cloquet
venture in 1895. Learning of the availability of the C.N. Nelson Lum--
ber Company, Weyerhaeuser persuaded the Cloquet Lumber Company and
several of his earlier associates from the Mississippi River Logging
Company era. to join with him in the formation of a new compa.ny for the
purpose of buying out Nelson. The resulting Northern Lumber Company
bought the C.N. Nelson properties for $1,900,000. Included in the pur-
chase were two mills located at Cloquet and some 600,000,000 feet of
pine timber. 28 The significance of this purchase and of the creation
of Northern Lumber Company is twofold. First, it at leCl,st doubled
Wey~rhaeuserfs co?trol over the Cloquet scene. Of the five major mills
operating in the area, two were controlled by Cloquet Lumber Company
and now two more were owned by Northern Lumber Company. All that re-
mained was the mill of the Johnson-Wentworth Company which in time would
also come into the vleyerhaeuser camp. Secondly, it marked the emergence
of Rudolph Weyerhaeuser, Frederick's third son, into the world of busi-
ness management. Just twenty seven years old, Rudolph was sent by his
father to manage th~ new operations in Cloquet. Like his older brothers,
Rudolph was given a position of great responsibility early in his career,
and he responded to the challenge in such a manner that the elder 1,{eyer-
27Ibid ., p. 118.
28Ibid ., p. 119.
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haeuser could soon relax his own efforts in northeastern Minnesota and
concentrate on new areas of interest. Rudolph's grasp of the business
was so complete that within a few years after coming to Cloquet he
was in fact if not in name the key figure in the Weyerhaeuser group
which ruled Cloquet. Finally, in 1902 the domination of Cloquet by
the Weyerhaeuser syndicate was completed with the purchase of the
Johnson-Wentworth Company, the last remaining independent operator on
the Cloquet scene, for $2,535,622. 29
The cycle was now complete. The Weyerhaeusers now controlled the
five large mills in Cloquet, and this control gave them unprecedented
power in the north woods. The union. of the major milling facilities
gave these men vast buying powers, particularly in ·regard to timber
land. Purchases could now be made jointly, and ~uch larger tracts
invoJying great sums of capital could be considered. The independents
in the area found themselves unable to handle such large transactions,
and as a result the Heyerhaeusers in many instances were able to drive
their own bargins. Probably the best single purchase in terms of timber
acquired for c~sh spent was a sale by the Northern Pacific Railroad
to the Northern Lumber Company in 1?00 of 31,348 acres. containing an
estimated 235,000,000 feet of choice pine timber. The sale price vias
$686,586. This amounted to approximately $22 an acre. The largest
transaction in terms of total volUme of timber came in 1905 when joint
purchases for the Cloquet mills totalling 550,000,000 feet of timber
wer~ made· for a price of $3,360,000. This timber was acquired from a·
variety of owners, including speculators, the railroads, the state, and
29· .Ibid., p. 190.
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other lumber c~npanies. B.Y 1908 the advantage of these joint efforts
in the purchasing of timber was most evident for by this date the three
vleyerhaeuser firms in Cloquet held approxima.tely 1,500, 000, 000 feet of
standing timber.30
Thus, with the completion of their Cloquet kingdom this small
group of men under the expert guidance of Frederick Weyerhaeuser had
reached the pinnacle of their success in midwestern lumbering. \ieyer-
haeuser had quickly emerged as the main force behind this success,
many times exhibiting the needed foresight and raw business courage to
forge ahead in the face of great risks while his competitors and even
his associates prefe::ered to move with greater caution. In assessing this
period of Minnesota's history; Timber and Men states that
By the late 1890's Weyerhaeuser had taken a tripartite role in
opening t~e hinterlands of Minnesota. Through Pine Tree and Missis-
sippi River Lumber he and his associates controlled an immense stump-
age. in the Upper Hississippi area, while through Cloquet a.nd North-
ern they held an even larger .amount of pineland on the St. Louis
watershed. They already oW11ed considerable timber in the pine area
lying still farther north. Through Nississippi River Lumber and
Northern Lumber they owned boom facilities in the two great hinter-
land territories. Through Pine Tree, Cloquet, and Northern they had
opened up the Upper Hississippi and Cloquet districts. FinallJr.
Weyerhaeuser had found roles in Minnesota for three of his sons.
As much as anyone man can be said to have expedited modern lumber-
ing in the remoter reaches of the state, he can'be singled out as
having done so.31
30Ibid., p. 191.
31Ibid., p. 120. The three sons were Rudolph and his younger brother,
Frederic~\'feyerhaeuser.,who went to work in the Cloquet area; and
Charles A. Weyerhae.user, an older brother, who was. placed in charge of
the Pine Tree operation. The eldest brother, John Philip \Jeyerhaeuser,
had his business initiation in the Wisconsin operations~ As will be
pointed out later, the aptitude and interest of all of his sons in Fred-
erick Tileyerhaeuser' sbusiness was no small factor in the success of the
organization and in its perpetuation.
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Although there is little doubt that Weyerhaeuser deserves such
tribute, one must in retrospect also take into consideration the means
by which he attain these successes. Also, the long term effects and
consequences of some of these successes tend to show these achievements
. in a somewhat different perspective. The authors of Timber and Men
tend to gloss over certa.in aspects of the practices of the 1veyerhaeuser
group, which definitely need a closer study if the complete story is to
be told.32 To say that their business practices were always one hundred
percent ethical would be stretching theimagination.33
Among the more prevalent business practices employed "by the early
lumbermen were such questionable tactics as the use of the durmny entry-
men, cutting "around fortyn, and the denial of access or right-of-way
to a competitor. stewning from the rather inept federal land acts of
the late 1880's and the subsequent laxity of their enforcement, the use
of dummy. entrymen arid cutting "around forty" were common means by \'rhich
32In reading Timber and Men the favora.ble attitude towerd ldeyer-
haeuser shovm by the authors is consistent i,V"ith the observation made by
Ray Ginger in commenting on the bias style of writing offered by Hidy
and Nevins in some of their other books. In evaluating the resources
used for his book, The Age "of Excess (Nei,v ..York = MacmillHn, 1965, pp. 330-
31.), Ginger states that 'tAllen·Nevins, Study in Pm-leI': John D. Rocke-
feller, Industrialist and PhilaYlthropist (1953); and Ralph VI. Hidy .and
Muriel E. Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business 1882-1911: History of Standard
Oil Company (New Jersey) . (1955), are based on ,\,.rid8. ranging research in
primary sources. But both of these \'forks seems to me to come to one--
sided, overly favorable conclusions becauses of their selective reporting
of·data." .
33Timber and Hen constantly implies such a white wash ·of the activ-
ities of the T,'leyerhaeuser group. For example, in corrrrnenting on theprac-
tice of acquiring land through the use of the dwmny entry, the authors
state that "diligent search has failed to show even one example of the
use of dummy entrymen on public lands for the benefit of Heyerhaeuser
or his associates. Again and again offers of false entry v.fere made to
these firms; they v{ere all,vays rejected. 1I (Hidy, Hill, and Nevins, Timber·
and Hen, pp. 133-34.)
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the wealthier lumber firms and land speculators added to their timber
holdings. The practice of the dlli~Y entrymen was used when the federal
government would open certain tracts of public land containing valuable
timber for sale to the general public. As the terms of such sales gener-
ally required permanent settlement on the land, the lumber companies
were not permitted to take part. They overcame this obstacle by having
agents or trusted employees claim acreage in their mm names only to
resell it to the lumber firms at or near the original government sale
price of $1.25 per acre. These people, owners in name only, hence be-
canle dummy entrymen. The Timber and Stone Act of 1878 was the best
example of the government's generosity in respect to the acquisition of
land titles. On the strength of this law "thousands of men ~iere sent
into the forests to file on timber claims, and in nearly every
instance, the entrymen had contracted in advance to transfer their titles
to some lumber ~ompany. 1134 Although the use of the dummy entry lias
standard practice, particularly among the larger firms) it was next to
impossible to put a stop to the illegal procedure. According to Ste-
phen Puter,
There was considerable-talk of indictments by the Federal grand jury,
a.nd it had a tendency to make the (illegal) land business unpopular
for the time being • • • • However, in spite of all the storm of in-
dignation that seemed to have pervaded the Government atmosphere,
there were comparatively few actual cancellations, the special agents
(of th~ Government), as usual, standing in with the ~and grabbers.
Thousands upon thousands of acres • • .' were secured • • . and
nearly all of these claims, to my (Puter's) certain knowle-dge, \'lere
fraudulently obtained.35 · ,
~ll-stephen A. Futer, Looters of the Public Domain (Portland: Port-
land Printing House, 1908), p. 21.
35Ibid ., p. 22'.
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The cutting of "around forty" involved an equally loose interpr.e-
tation of the existing land laws and the terms of sale set forth by the
federal Land Office. The lumbermen, taking advantage of the situation,
,would often buy from the state or federal government forty acres of tim-
ber, which was the smallest unit in which timberland ordinarily changed
hands. They would then send their loggers into cut the timber, telling
the foreman to log Ifaround (approximately) forty acres." The loggers
would then proceed to cut around the original forty acres. "First the
forty acres to the north, then to the east, the south, the west. It was
thought a neat play on words, and it tickled everyone"except the haras-
sed timber agents of the state and local go~ernments.,,36 If and vlhen this
illegal practice was detected, the punishnlent hardly deterred further
infractions. The law read that the trespasser should pay the land's
lIestimated value, in any case not less than $1.25 per acre." As with the
practice of using the dummy entryman, Weyerhaeuser and the other lumber-
men of the period were for the most part able to hide their jllcgal oper-
ations extremely well. If caught, it was a small nmtter to pay the $1.25
per acre penalty.
Once the larger firms gained control over large amounts of land
they could actually dictate the amount of lumbering activity within the
given region merely by regulating their competition's entry to its lands.
The various Ueyerhaeuser firms both in the Upper Hidwest and later in the
Pacific Northwest became in tinle one of the better exponents of this
questionable tactic of the denial of access. It was comrrlon for the
Weyerhaeuser firms to charge a competing lumber company as much or more
36Holbrook, Holy Old Hack~navr, p. 93.
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than the land itself was worth for the right to cross Weyerhaeuser land
to get to their (the competing firm's) timberland. More often than not
the competition had no recourse but to sell their land t_o \'1eyerhaeuser
,at the latter's price.3? It was chiefly through the ruthless use of
this practice that the ~'reyerhaeuser Timber Company was to slovlly but
surely cut off the timber supply of the Long-Bell Lumber Company, thus
eliminating one of their major competitors in the Pacific Northwest.38
However, in defense of Weyerhaeuser and his contemporaries it must,
be said that their methods of operation, while questionable by todayt s
standards,were generally compatible with the spirit of their times. It
is probably safe to say that in keeping with the philosophy of economic
Dar~inism which prevailed during the pre-1900 period and during the first
few years of this century and which dictated that only the strongest and
most resourceful will become wealthy, Weyerhaeuser and his group were no
more unethical i~ their business dealings than were many other business-
men or concerns of the time regardless of the industry in which they were
engaged. In the business arena vlhere it was a ca.se of survival of the
fittest, those who emerged on top, although often accused of using illegal
means, were nevertheless held in grea.t awe and respect for the ends which
they had attained.
In his battles Heyerhaeuser vlas the all-conquering victor. His
power is vividly shm'm in the reminiscences of two men vTho had -the op-
portunity to personally observe the deeds of Frederick Weyerhaeuser, his
37U.S., Department of Commerce, The. IJumbe~ 'Industry (Hashington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1914), II, p.l1~ ..
38Hidy, Hill,and Nevins, Timber and Nen, pp. 278-79. Also, see
J.H. McClellan, Jr., LongvieVl, The Planned 'City (Portland: Binford, 1947),
p. 153.
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sons, and their business partners. One of these men, Albert Erickson~
was a former employee of the vveyerhaeuser organization ·in northern
l-linnesota at the turn of the century.39 Mr. Erickson had ''lorked as a
laborer in Vleyerhaeuser's Northern 11J!llber Company mill at Cloquet during
the first two decades of this century. Although flavored with occasion...
al personal bias, the descriptions of the Cloquet operations by 1'JT • Erick-
son were of great interest. As has been pointed out, by 1900 the Weyer-
haeuser group was the dominant force in the area, and Weyerhaeuser's two
youngest sons, particularly Rudolph Weyerhaeuser, 1-V"ere among· the leaders
of this' group. Vw. Erickson depicted Rudolph and his cohorts as being
extremely ruthless men, geared to milk the top dollar from their hold-
ings, while at the same time almost completely ignoring the plight of the
woods and mill workers. Many times Mr. Erickson' claimed to have seen
Rud.olph ~'Je;YTerhaeuser vialk through the mill, much like a king surveying
his domain, ordering his subordinates to press the men and machines for
more and more production. Unskilled labor in the Cloquet region was
completely at the mercy of management, for it had no alternative occu-
pations to use as bargining power in any confrontation with management.
The situation was the same as it had been in almost every preceding lum-
.bering area. The operators had an ideal situation in which a captive,
. -
unskilled labor force wit~out effective leadership or organization and
isolated from job opportunities in other fields was theirs to manipulate
to the best of their advantage. The labor force was the most variable
39Interviews \'rith Albert Erickson between January, 1959 and August,
1960, St. Peter, Ninnesota. At the time I met gr. Erickson,he'was eighty
years old and still actively operating his own small retail lumber yard in
St. Peter.
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factor of production. According to Hr. Erickson, the Weyerhaeuser
organization made thG most of the situation. The hours were long, the
working conditions deplorable with safety guards and safety practices
almost non-existent, and the wages were at the minimum-level.
Also, at times the vveyerhaeusers, in Mr. Ericksonrs words, were
nothing more than "criminals ll in their exploitation of the land for
their personal gain. He traced the disastrous and tragic Cloquet Burn
of 1918 directly to the exploitation of the forests by the Cloquet
_lumbermen. As a result of this fire the town of Cloquet was virtually
wiped out. The fire completely destroyed two of the five sawmills and
the planing mills, storage sheds, and other out-buildings of all five
sawmills. Most of the houses in the area were also destroyed. The only
structures left standing after the fire were three sawmills, a paper
mill owned by ~ieyerhaeuser, a few homes, and the seventeen lIrecreation
establishments" which had been built on Dunlop Island in the middle of
the St: Louis River. In addition to this material loss, some 538 people
are known to have lost their lives during the blaze.40 Although no
definite blame has ever been established for the Cloquet fire which
consumed approximately 1,500 square miles, Mr .. Erickson ·claimed that
much of the blame belongs to the lumber companies of Cloquet. In his
opinion, the operators had greedily cut the trees for the sole purpose
of making a large profit, and little thought had been given to sound
conservation. No fire precautions had been t~ken in the woods. Much
slash was left to lie in the logged over areas. That slash which was
40Stm'lart H. Holbrook, Burning An Empire (New York: Eac~iJ.lan, 1952),
p. 37.
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piled and burned vras often burned indiscriminately with little thought
to the possible consequences. Mr. Erickson also claimed that there were
no fire roads or breaks, and little firefighting equipment was available.
Sound conservation practices were no more of a reality than they had
been in the Bangor and Saginaw eras. Conservation, fire prevention and
control, and reforestation all meant extra expense which could not be
tolerated by the operators_if the high short term profits were to be
maintained.
However, it was interesting to note that in his denunciation of
"Big Lumber", Mr. Erickson was certainly not bitter.4l As he explained
it, this ""vas just the way things were done in those days. Those with
money had the power to do pretty much as they wished, and in Cloquet
at least there was no great desire to change or condemn this system.
In much agreement with the observations of Albert Erickson was
Sanford Delyea, a contemporary of Erickson1s, who got his start in the
lunmer business with Weyerhaeuser's Cloquet Lumber Company at the turn
of the century.42 Delyea also told of hmv the lrJeyerhaeuser group drove
4~idence of Erickson's matter-of-fact approach and apparent lack
of personal bitterness was quite obvious in 1960. In spite of all his
experiences, he still demanded nothing but Weyerhaeuser lumber products
in his retail yard, thus -revealing that he ""fas rather proud of his as--
sociation with history.
42Interviews with -Sanford Delyeabetween Januar~ 1959 and August,
1960, Mankato, Minnesota. When Delyea retired from Weyerhaeuser in 1955,
he had .accumulated some fifty years with the organization, having started
work for the company as a boy of fifteen in _Cloquet. Later moving on to
the Pacific Northwest, he eventually worked into -the Imver ranks of man...
agement, finally ending his career as a salesman for \veyerhaeuser in
southwestern Minnesota.-
-The Delyea family had quite a reputation in logging circles. San-
ford and his brother, Bill Delyea, were well knmvn for their abilities in
the sport of log birling. Bill was at one time considered the world champ-
ion of this rugger sport (Holbrook, Holy Old Mackinaw, pp. 128-29).
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toward complete domination of the Cloquet scene. Built entirely on
sawdust, the town hunnned with excitJllent both day and night. During the
day the nL111s throbbed with activity, and at night as the mill refuse
burners illuminated the area, the ~~ll hands and those loggers who were
in town carried on a rough and ready social life, concentrating their
after-hours efforts on the seventeen saloons and/or fancy houses nestled
on Dunlop's Island. According to ~~. Delyea, when the annual spring log
drive was safely in the booms, the cOJIl.laotion in Cloquet was equal to the
.combined effects of "circus day, Christmas, and a Polish wedding recept-
ion tr •
In spite of the occasional revelry, all "las certainly not fun. The
men of Cloquet faced constant danger, both in the woods and in the mills.
Delyea's description of these operations was much the same as that of Al-
bert Erickson. Production was the sale goal of the lumbermen. The mill
hands were goaded on with little heed for personal safety. As one author
has aptly described the prevailing attitude of the early lumber operators,
they looked upon themselves as being
• • • rugged individualists of the old stamp, many of whom had risen
to positions of leadership form the lowest rungs of the industry by
exercising the virtues of perseverance, frugality; and initia.tive.
They quite understandably accepted the prevailing philosophy of busi-
ness success as the attainable end of exercising such virtue, and
they tended to project their attitudes into their labor force, ex--
pecting them to take conditions as they came or to"rise above the
conditions in the only acceptable manner! They trea.ted their employees
in a rather ruthless manner, hiring masses of men when the market was
favorable and pressing them to great production through long hours
of work and then firing men 11holesale when the lumber market fell.
There was no hint in their beha.vior that they felt that mutual ob-
ligation betHeen employer and employee was a desira.ble goal in the
industry.43
43Robert L. Tyler, ItThe Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen"
(Unpublished seminar paper, Oregon Historical Society Collection, Portland,
1951), p. 1.
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The workers in the mills responded because they knew no other
alternative. Many wer~ ex-loggers who not only knew how to work but
actually enjoyed it and took great pride in their efforts. In the woods
the typical logger was expected to remain in the forest for months on
end, working in sub-freezing weather from before sun rise until after
darkness had set in in the evening. He was expected to live in Spartan-
lik~ camps which were at best bleak outposts in the wilderness whose
r .
living conditions were generally substandard. If a man could not make
the grade as a "timber beast", he didn't hang around camp long, for the
camp foreman always had a new recruit ready to take over.
In cormnenting on his own experiences as a logger for the Cloquet
Lumber Company, ~IT. Delyea said that it was a common practice &~ongall
of the logging outfits, including those of the Weyerhaeuser firms, to
occasionally indulge in such questionable logging methods as "cutting
around forty" and jumping survey lines. t\lhether done intentionally
or unintentionally there was always the ready-made excuse that deep in
the forest it was impossible at times to get true bearings. As San-
ford related it,. such practices were used by all of ~he operators as a
natural or "legal" method in their intense struggle to -survive.
It is interesting to note that this is much the same reaction
as that of ¥iI'. Erickson. Although admitting that there "las room for
some doubt about certain practices of the Vfeyerhaeuser group, particular-
ly during these early years, Sanford Delyea was always quick to assert
that in his estimation the conditions of this period made these methods
necessary. Apparently, the successful man of the late 1800's and early
1900's was the envy of almost everyone, even' though he may not have had
the respect of all. Even a certain amount of ruthlessness was accepted
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as necessary to achieve the end goal of wealth. The greater one's
fortQ~e, the greater the awe in which he was held by his contemporaries.
Weyerhaeuser was no exception, at least among the lwnbermen of the north-
woods. 44
This was the nature of the man whose personal fortune at the time
of his death in 1914 rivaled and perhaps even surpassed all of the other
industrial giants of his time. 45 By the time Weyerhaeuser moved to
St. Paul in 1891, he was rapidly becoming the recognized ruler of the
economy of the Upper l'1idwest, even though the major part of, his vast
wealth was still to come. One author has estimated that at the height
of their pO\-rer in the 1-1iddle v[est the v[ey'erhaeuser combine controlled
approximately 10,000,000 acres of timber. 46 However, through lack of
conservation and the disastrous forest fires, particularly "the Hinckley
Burn of 1894 and the Cloquet Burn of 1918, these stands of virgin timber
44To :Hr. Delyea, v1J"eyerhaeuser was a way of life, and he never
seemed to tire of retelling of the event which made the most lasting
impression on him during his own exciting life as a lumberman. It hap-
pened long ago when Sanford was still in his teens, working on the mill
pond at the Cloquet Lumber Company. After performing a dif.ficult and
dangerous maneuver on the logs, he was rewarded for his efforts with a
handshake and a word of pra'ise from "the original }'U'. Heyerhaeuser. n
When Sanford told this story, it was almost magical to see the feeling
of pride and reverence which would come over him. .
45Thereseems to be"no clear estimate of Frederi~k Heyerhaeuser's
personal fortune at the time of his death. ~trers in History of the Great
American Fortunes claims it was "300,000,000, or thereabou.ts. lt RoyE. Ap-
pleman in his article says that the figure ranged from $300,000,000 to
$600,000,000 ("Timber Empire From the Public Domain", Mississippi Valley
Historical Revievl, S.eptember, 1939, XXVI, No.2). C.P. Norcross in his
article, "Richer Than Rockefeller - Heyerhaeuser
"
, estimated the Heyer-
haeuser fortune to be more than that of John D. Rockefeller. Timber and
.Hell, the He;yerhaeuser Company history, makes no mention of the exact amount
of Frederick Ueyerhaeuser's personal fortune.
46Appleman, "Timber Empire From the Public Domain ll , p. 202.
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were depleted to the point where it was no longer profitable to man-
ufacture lumber on a major scale. The Cloquet mills struggled on for
another decade after the Cloquet fire, some years even losing money on
their lumber production. Finally in 1928 the vleyerhaeuser lumber firms
were dissolved, and their properties were taken over by Northwest Paper
Company, another Weyerhaeuser firm.
Before leaving this era in the history of lumbering it is inter-
esting in retrospect to note several significant milestones which had
great influence on the later history of the industry. First, and most
significant, was the fact that for the first time a definite leader had
arisen from the ranks of the lumbermen. Frederick Weyerhaeuser and the
organizations which he and his associates had developed became the stand-
ard after which other lumbermen patterned their own operations. Never
before had the lumber industry witnessed such cooperation, organization,
and success among a group of lumbermen. By the time Heyerhaeuser moved
into l'1innesota with his operations, he seems to have established the
pattern for future development: acquire vast timber reserves; acquire
adequate logging, booming, and milling facilities; then integrate the
whole operation. The" result of Heyerhaeuser's success in following this
plan was that the lumber business had its first true giant. No longer
was it an industry composed entirely of many small independent operators,
whose individualism and competitiveness was often their o~m undoing. Now
lumbering was big business, and the Weyerhaeuser syndicate had made it so.
Other significant aspects of this period of development are tied to
the grovrth of ~'Teyerhaeuser. Not only" was the size of this organization
unique to the industry at this time, but it often alloy-red or at times act-:
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ually forced the Weyerhaeuser group to make additional advances in
corporate organization and management. ay the time they reached Cloquet
their concept of cooperation was a proven principle. Initially it had.
been restricted to solely the levels of logging, booming, and rafting.
Now in Cloquet the size and proximity of the \'leyerhaeuser mills demanded
further efforts in cooperation. Nutual timberland purchases were made.
Joint ownership of logging railroads was introduced. On the mill pro-
duction level efforts were made to coordinate product lines, and separate,
joint-owned manufacturing companies, such as the Cloquet Tie and Post
Company, were established to mill the products which the parent firms
could not or would not handle.' In the distribution end of the business
the first successful steps in the industry's history were made as the
Cloquet mills disbanded their_separate retail stores and consolidated
into one retail outlet for the immediate Cloquet area. At the saJne time
the three firms made the move to establish joint wholesale outlets, open-
ing offices in Hinneapolis a.nd Chicago in 1907 and acquiring a wholesale
distribution yard in Buffalo, Nmv York the same year. 47 All of these
attempts at, cooperation were turning points in lumbering history.
Also, in the areas of conservation and labor relations definite
attempts were finally initiated to alleviate reoccurring p~oblems which
47Hidy, Hill, and Nevins, Timber and Men, p. 192. Weyerhaeuser
placed \V.E. Thomas in charge of the Hinneapolis office. After a successful'
career as a wholepaler, Thomas later left the Weyerhaeuser organization
and established himself as an outst&nding retail lumberman. Thomas
built up a.series of highly successful retail lumberyards across the
southern edge of Minnesota with headquarters in Lake Crystal, near Man-
kato. 8'J 1960, the organiza.tion was being run· by a son and tl,vO grandsons.
The holdings had d\'iindled to five retail yards, and it was obvious after
calling on these yards in my capacity as a salesman for the Weyerhaeuser
Sales Company that the dedication to the cause of lu.mber of 1fI.E. Thomas
had died with him.
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plagued the industry. B,y the turn of the century the need for these
reforms was being forcefully pointed out by an irate public. The Weyer-
haeuser syndicate because of its size and relative importance became
a main target of these attacks o However, this great size while arousing
suspicion was also the chief factor 1j.fhich allowed vleyerhaeuser to become
the leader of the industry in developing enlightened conservation and
labor policies.
In respect to the conservation problem, the Weyerhaeuser firms felt
the full force of the pressure being brought to bear by the ground s1",ell_
of public opinion against the so-called "Timber Barons" and their seeming-
ly selfish exploitation of a basic resource. 48 The culmination of this
movement crone with the Cloquet Burn which, rightJ~ or wrongly, the public
blamed on the lwnbermen of Cloquet. Normally when such disasters had
occurred in the past, the lumbermen had merely picked up and moved on to
the next forest, paying little heed to the blame placed on them by the
public. But by 1918 the American public was no longer willing to over-
look such a hugh loss of timber and of lives, and well aware of its power
as a result of the suc~esses of the Progressive movement during the first
years of this century, it was unrelenting in its demands against the lurrilier
industry for reforms in -conservation.
Similar pressure on the lumbermen concerning the labor problem was
48The feelings of the public concerning the lumber industry were
given voice through the efforts of the muckraking-journalism of the period.
Examples of these vJTitings include Charles P. Norcross' IlRicher Than
Rockefeller - Weyerhaeuser"; Charles E. -Russell's lIThe E:TsteriousOctopus:
Story of the S~range and Powerful Organization That Controls the American
Lumber Trade" (The Horld Today, February, 1912, XXI, pp. 1735-50.-); Emer-
son Hough's "The Slaughter of the Trees" (~ver.Y.2~yts, Hay, ~908, XVIII,
pp.579-92.); and S.E. Hhite's "The Fight for the Forests ll (JIJnerican H§.ga-
ine, January, 1908, LXV, pp.252....61.).
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causing further anxiety. The threat of organized labor, particularly
in the form of the International Vlorkers of the Horld (IWV'J), who were
in their heyday between 1910 and 1920, posed an increasingly formidable
barrier to the continued abuse of the labor force by the lumbermen. The
operators had had things too much in their favor for too long a time to
give in meekly to labor's demands. Perhaps, if minor 'concessions could
be ipitiated by the mill owners and some job sta.bility established,
labor would not organize to any great eA~ent in the lumber industry. A
final consideration was that the larger firms, particularly v{eyerhaeuser,
simply had too large a financial investment in their I~nnesota holdings
to pick up and leave.
Feeling these pressures, the Weyerhaeuser group attempted a daring
experiment. They began to examine the possibilities of diversification
inotother forest product fields. Since 1910 the Weyerhaeuser firm,
Northwest Paper Company, had existed in Cloquet and had represented a
definite· attempt at diversification and at econorrdc stabilization of the
inunediate area. But with the fire of 1918 and the lean lumber production
years which followed it was obvious that Northwest Paper could not pos-
sibly take up all the slack. Many members of the syndicate, including
Rudolph vJeyerhaeuser, "Viere discoura.ged to the pdint of giving up, but
others expressed a desire to reconstruct Cloquet and find new products
. and new markets for the utilization of the remaining white pine timber
and also the vast amount of weed species which escaped damage or which
were bound to grow in place of the destroyed white pine. The result was
the_Wood Conversion Company, established in 1922 for the expressed purpose
of turning these trees, formerly considered valueless, into profit. Mak-
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ing such products as insulation and acoustical ceiling tile from the
fiber of the aspen, birch, and jack pine, this new company for the first
time in the lumber industry's history began to make use of waste products.
During the" ~renties the combined operations of the rebuilt lumber mills,
North\iest Paper Company, and "VJood Conversion Company resulted in almost
total utilization of the remaining timber. This was a big step toward
a sound conservation policy. ~Vhen the lumber mills finally did close,
the other industries remained and were able to absorb many of the un-
employed logge'rs and millhands. Nany did move on west with· the lumber
industry, but those who remained had a definite chance for an econoITQc
survival. ~'Jeyerhaeuser and the rest of the i.ndustry \'lere beginning to
learn the true value of both their natural resource and their human
resource, and at last they v-rere taking the initial steps in the conservat-
ion of both.
CHAPTER III
The.emergence of the first real giant in the lumber industry
coincided with the end of the industry's dominance of the economy of
the Upper Mississippi area. The trees were no longer available in
sufficient qua.ntity to sustain the continuance of lumber production on
a large scale. Once again the lumberman, albeit with his growing con-
. cern for conservation, decided the time was ripe to pick up and move on
to the next forested area. With the stinging denounciations of the
American public in general and the muckrakers in particular ringing in
their ears the Minnesota and Wisconsin lumbermen began moving west.
It was the repetition of the old theme but with a new twist which
posed seemingly insurmountable problems to many lumbermen who contem-
plated the move. The new forest was not It just over the next, hill."
Between the "next. hill" and the western forest lay a vast expanse of
open plains and two very formidable mountain ranges. The forests of
the Pacific Northwest were most appealing, but what good were they to
a lumber manufacturer if there .were no practical, economical way of
getting the finished products to the country's major lumber markets in
the Midwest and in the East? Not only vias the di.stance between mill and
market a major problem, but the forest itself was causing great concern.
Except for the stand of white pine in northern Idaho, the timber of the
Pacific Northwest was predominantly Douglas Fir. This was obviously a
species high in corrunercial value, but the tree grew to such a hugh size
and in terrain· so rugged that an entirely new concept of. logging would
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have to be developed. Even the white pine of Idaho would require new
methods of logging because it too grew in rugged mountainous country
greatly different from the relatively even terrain in the Upper Midwest,
which was well interlaced.with navigable rivers. In the forests of
Minnesota and W~sconsin the loggers had been able to take advantage of
the cheap transportation offered by the horse drawn sleighs in the.win-
ter and the deep streams, rivers, and lakes in the spring and Slli~er.
In the forests of the West the mountainous terrain ruled out the use of
.sleighs. As for the waterways of the West, only' the Clearwater River
of Idaho could be used extensively for log drives, although other rivers
and bodies of water \vere ac.ceptable for log rafting operations. 1
Initially the problem and the expense of logging would probably
not have been too great for the forests located near these larger rivers
and bodies of water could be logged, and the logs skidded directly to
the water or to a nearby mill. The problem would come when the trees
near the water had been harvested. The farther away from navigable
water the forests were, the greater the expense of logging and lumbering
would become. With the interior terrain too steep and the size of the
logs too great to use the sleighs, carts, and other logging rigs used
in the midwest ,ern logging operations, it appeared that, if the timber of
..
the West were to be exploited, new logging methods would have to be devised.
IThe Clea~NaterRiverwas th~ only river of a~y consequence in the
West us-ed for log driving. Ironically, it is ,the only river in the United
States today which still experiences the annual Jog drive complete with
all the old time color and drama. Potlatch -Forests, Inc. still uses the
Clearwater each spring to drive their logs accumulated during the winter
season from the woods down river to their Lewiston, Idaho manufacturing
complex (nIdaho Loggers Battle A River", National G_eographic, Ju::J-y, 1951,
pp. 117-30. Also, see Ralph ~l. Andrews, Glory Days of Loggjng (Seattle:
Superior Publishing Co., 1956), p. 83.).
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Ultimately, it \-fould mean the building of expensi~e logging railroads,
\
the use of the steam donkey and other heavy, mechanized equipment, and
the development of completely new logging concepts, such as the high
2lead system. The prospects of such expensive logging costs, not to
mention the expected increases in Jl1illing costs due to the heavier
equipment needed to handle the larger logs, made the Hidwest lumbermen
think twice about the proposed move to the forests of the Pacific North-
west. It was obviously going to kake a great deal of financial backing
and no small amount of business courage to take advantage of the new
situation.
In the years prior to 1900 only a handful of early lu.mbermen
ventured into the Pacific Northwest woods. All of these tended to remain
comparatively small in the size of their operations and for the most 'part
completely independent of each other with little or no mutual recognition
or co~~unication. The first sawmill on the Coast supposedly was built
in 1811-1 at Oregon City, Oregon on the banks of the Viillamette River. 3
Shortly after this mill was established, others destined to- be more
permanent and historically mor~ significant were built in Oregon and
Washington •. Probably the first sa\vmill of any consequerrce -in the region
was loca~ed in Seattle 'Vfhere Henry _Yesler built his mill at tide~vater on
2
- The high lead system of logging involves the rigging. of a spar
tree with appropriate blocks and tackle. With the mechanical steam
donkeys supplying the necessary pm'fer the logs are then attached to
cables -and skidded to the landing to be then ~oaded' on to whatever means
of transportation -is available. Although used less frequently since
the advent of neat" (tractor) logging, the high lead system proved to
be the most practical and often the only answer to logging the mOlll1t-
ainous forests of the Pacific North''l6st in the first half of this cen-
tury.
3Holbrook, Holy Old Hackinm'l, p. 166.
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Puget SOlmd.. The year was 1853.4 In 1854 Yesler received competition
as the 'Pope and Talbot orga.nization out of San Francisco began cutting
. at their twin mills located at Port Gamble and Port Ludlow, Washington.
These mills and others in this early era intentionally located near the
tidewater areas for two main reasons. First of all, there was the ac-
cessibility of the nearby timber 'which meant reduced logging costs.
Secopdly, with the major m?rket for northwestern lumber at the time being
in the export trade market, a mill to succeed and grow had to be able to
service ocean going vessels.· The more successful mills of the day chose
the Puget Sound region over the Columbia River and other harbor areas
along the Oregon and Washington coast because there was no bar to cross,
thus eliminating a real danger.
However, the predominance of the cargo market and the importance
of the cargo facilities did not stop other lumbermen from venturing into
the hinterland. The Jones Lumber Company began operations in Portland in
1860, cutting lwnber for the expanding local market of the Willamette
Valley. 5 Sol Simpson came from Quebec to found the Simpson Logging Com-
4Stewart H. Holbrook, The Far Corner, (NeVi York: Hacmillan, 1952),
p. 247. A skid road comprised of l~gs led dOl-m the nearby hills to .Yes-
ler I s mill. Logs were skidded down this road by oxen. to the mill. As
time went by, saloons, boarding houses, and other less respectable houses
catering to the whims and fancies of the loggers and seam.en Here built
along this road near the mill. Long after the Yesler mill was gone, the
surrounding buildings and businesses remained as did the n~~efor the'
area, skidroad. As Seattle grew up around this are~, the old logging
road become a street with the formal name ~ Yesler 1vay, yet even today
Yesler 'day is synonymous with skidroad. This ",ras the original skidro-ad
as the term is known today.
5The Jones Lumber Company finally ceased operations in 1962. The
mill was eventually dismantled and the shipping sheds were leased to the
Weyerhaeuser Company, which nm1 uses them for a wholesale distribution
center.
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pany at Shelton, Washington. The Minnesota lumbering firms of Brooks-
Scanlon and of Shevlin-·Hixon both chose the pine country of Bend, Ore-
gone C.A. Smith Lumber Company settled near tidewater at Coos Bay, Ore-
gon, while the firm of McMillan-Bloedel began their early operations in
British Columbia. Also, in Oregon John Yean and Simon Benson built
their personal fame and fortune on lumbering. The list of these early
lumbering pioneers in the Northwest goes on and on as many historically
I
i
famous names in both Washington and Oregon are traceable back to often
humble beginnings in the initia.l phases of the region I s lumber industry.
All of these early lumbermen staked out their mm small domains
in the Pacific Northvrest, but none achieved a position of dominance
during the latter years of the neneteenth century. Several factors
combined to keep the various operators relatively small and independent.
As had been the case in former lu~bering regions, there was always a
great deal of competition. In spite of the fact that logging and milling
on a large scale took a considerable amount of capital investment, it
was also true that anyone with an ax, a saw, and the necessary desire
could "get into the lumber business." There were always small tracts
of timber for sale, and when the market - particula:rly the loce.l market-
was favorable, the opportunity was often too enticing for many men to
pass it by! In short, the early lumber industry of the region on the
Coast was much like that of the other lumbering areas. It was basically
easy to go into the business and just as easy to get out of it. Some
were able to make a success of their venture. Others left after gaining
their goals. still others failed completely.
In addition to the lure of the apparent- fina.ncial opportunities
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which brought a nwnber of relatively small lumbering operations to' the
region, there were other reasons 1'lhy the early lumbernien in Oregon and
I
Washington remained small and independent. First, there was always the'
fact that the Pacific Northwest was too far from the major lumber markets
of the country. Except for those mills on tidewater which could cater
to the export trade, there were really no large sales possibilities for
most:mills'once they had satisfied the local trade. Secondly, the tra-
i
ditional mistrust of these early ,lumbermen served to isolate them from
their competitors and even the rest of the n~tion. This was the same
mistrust which Weyerhaeuser hed found in his early attempts to unite
the Mississippi Valley lumbermen. Each operator tended to be highly
secretive in his dealings and refused to share innovations in machinery
and methods with his competitors. Such practices and attitudes could
only serve to increase the provincialism and independence of the various
lumbermen. Finally, the physical size and nature of the region actually
acted against the operators, keeping them small and isolated~ Com-
munications in many areas were next to j~possible as the extreme dis-
tances, the mountainous country, and the lack of navigable rivers kept
travel down to a minimum. These geographical factors combined with the
psychological factors of mistrust and secrecy, preventing the ltunbermen
from establishing any degree of uniformity within the industry. These
early years in the Pacific Northwe~t saw no trade association, no grad~
ing rules, little manufacturing uniformity, no quality control, and no
effort to understand the complexities of the lumber market.
The resulting independence of the small, individue.l logging com-
panies. and lumber mills precipitated many add;i.tional problems vlhich were
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as large in scope and as seemingly insurmountable as those which caused
the plight of the IUlnbermen in the first place. The small size of their
operations made it extremely difficult for most operators to handle the
hugh Douglc.s Fir logs efficiently'. To the increased expense incurred in
logging this new species was added the additional increased expense of
milling the Douglas Fir logs. With logs often running from ten to six-
teen feet in diameter, the milling equipment had to be made to a cor-
I
responding size. Few mill owners were \'lilling and able to invest in much
except the basic machinery needed to rough saw the lumber. Those who did
aspire to better their product and their production more often than not
had to go deeply in debt to purchase the necessary machinery to do the
job.' This overextension of their credit many times proved fatal to
their businesses 1'fhen the lumber market took one of its periodic tail-
spins. 6
Marketing problems also resulted from this independence on the part
of the operators. To begin with, there had to be a massive public re-
lations campaign to sell the established lumber markets of the nation and
the world on the superior merits of Douglas Fir lumber. Historically,
pine had been the predominant softwood lumber species, and little was
known of the quality and merits of Douglas Fir for the simple reaSon
that it grew only in the -Pacific Northvrest and hence was virtua.lly an
unknO\VTI wood prior to the late 1800's. As long as the western lumbermen
6As author Paul Hosmer humorously puts it in his book, N01'l \'le' re
Loggin' (Portland: Binford &Hort, 1930, p. 42.), "one year out of seVen
(in the lumber industry) is a good one, while the other six are steady
and consistent losers, and the only ray of sunshine in the sky is the
fact that the good year is a humdinger." Although the economic cycles
of the lumber industry have never been quite. this prBcise, there has
been over the years the tendency to feast or fawine.
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remained small and independent, there was little hope of accomplishing
this educational task. Funds and a cooperative, industry-wide effort
were needed to get the message across. ~fuen neither of these factors
was forthcoming, the individual members of the industry ha.d to forget
about the distant, more lucrative markets. Instead, they had to remain
contented with what the local ma.rket had to offer and in doing so had
to postpone any ideas of growth.
An additional aspect of the marketing problem faced by the mills
of the Pacific Northwest was that their reluctance to join together in
industrial associations cost them all in valuable market information.
No lu.rnber manufacturer of that period had the means to finance his mill
complete marketing research. Again what was needed was the effort of
an industry-wide association, studying the nation's demand for lumber
and advising its members of its findings. In the absence of this in-
formation, the independent operators continued to follo1"[ the traditlonal
milling and sales philosophy which has plague the industry even to this
day. That philosophy was that the mill should produce what it could
produce the best and then force the customer to buy the end product.
At the time this philosophy· might have \-forked had the wills still been
in the Midwest, close to the major lumber markets which were still con-
suming vast a.mounts of lumber in meeting the construction demands of the
ever growing midwestern population •. But in the Pacific Northwest where
the supply was gr.eat compared to the relatively small demand,. this sales
attitude often caused more harm than good. :Hills more often than not
were forced to curtail production until surplus production was sold,
often at a loss. At other times they merely oversold the customer, thus
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forcing him out of the market for an unreasonable length of time •. Thi.s
only caused more surplus production in the industry, as there \faS usual-
ly no corresponding curtailment of production. This over-production
problem constantly plagued the industry and was a major reason why the
industry in the Pacific Northwest fared so badly.in the economic panics
of 1873 and 1893. 7 Attempts at industrial associations were made follow-
ing each of these panics, but once prosperity returned, the lumbermen
went back to their traditional independent pbilosophies and began to
produce as each felt best for his particular concern. Had the customers
been allowed to dictate the type and quantity of production, the small
mills might well have received the necessary stimulus to grow.
Finally, the problem of conservation was directly affected by the
small size and independence of the Pacific Northwest lumber operations.
Most of these lumbermen had come from other areas and were for the most
part familiar with the historical lack of conservation practiced by the
industry. The reason the lumbermen had had to move to the Pacific North-
v.Test was basically centered around the conservation problem in former
lumbering .regions. They also could see that although the West had a
fantastically large t:L:llber resource, it too could only last so long
without a sound conservation policy. Obvious to all was the simple fact
that this was the last great stand of timber in the nation. When it
was cut, there would be no more. Nevertheless, the lumbermen, forced
to rerr~in small and independent by the combination of geographical,
7rn 1873 the wholesale price index for lumber was down to 75
(1910-1914 = 100). In 1893 it slipped all the Hay to 60 (U.3., De-
partment of Agriculture, Historical Forestrl: Sta~istics of the U.S.
(Hashington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 22.).
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economic, and physchological forces working against them, could adopt
no other conservation policy but that which had failed so completely
in other areas. The conservation policy of the early western lumber-
men became no conservation policy at all. The financial position of
each operator dictated his policy. Few, if any, had sufficient finan-
cial means to cope with the problem of conservation. Lack of money
meant little possibility of acquiring sufficient timber reserves which
in turn meant that the emphasis was placed on the immediate short term
gains. Such timber reserves would have allowed the timber ovmer to
cut only when the market was favorable. Without the reserves the lumber-
man was forced to purchase small tracts of timber and log them imnlediate-
ly, regardless of the market. As a result, much timber was indiscrim- o
inately cut before maturity and without regard to reforestation or fire
.hazards. Lack of money also meant little or nothing was spent on fire
prevention or control. If a purchased tract of timber was to be logged
immediately, there seemed to be little sense in spending money on fire
precaution measures, such as roa.ds and lookouts. Consequently, the
region suffered disastrous forest fires in the late 1800's and the early
1900·' s.B
~Iost of the great forest burns in the Pacific Northwest have been
in Oregon. The first recorded forest fire was in 1846-(YaquinaBurn).
There followed the Nestucca. Burn (1860), the Coos Burn (1868), the St. Hel-
ens Burn (1868), the Yacolt Burn (1902), the Tillamook 3urn (1933) ,and
the Bandon Burn (1936). The State' of voJashington also shared the st. Hel-
ens Burn of 1868 and the Yacolt Burn of 1902< (Holbrook,. Burning An Em-
pire, pp. 108-20). It is significant that Oregon during this period
had more small, independent lumbering operations than did l/lashington (Hidy,
Hill, and Nevins, Timber and Men, p. 219). In 1935 there were a total
of l1079 mills operating in \-lestern Oregon and 423 mills in western Hash-
ington Ovest Coast Lumber Association, Hest Coast Lumber Fa.cts (Seattle:
West Coast LQmber Association, 1936), p. 16).
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other practices of the period failed to observe basic rules of
conservation. The early loggers lacked sufficient equipment to cope
with many of the hugh trees. The bark layer arotmd the base of the
Douglas Fir was often so thick and tough that it was often easier to cut
the trees as much as ten or twelve feet above the ground. Also, the
high stunp was considered a necessity along the coastal area due to the
dense undergrowth resulting from the heavy ralnfall. 9 Besides the waste
of the high stumps, there was also the waste caused by the logging rule
of the early days in the Pacific Northwest which prevented logs of less
than sixteen inches in diameter from being sent to the smvrnill. ~O The
mills felt that they could not make money milling these relatively
sma.ll logs. The affect of this practice in retarding conservation can
not be underestimated. It was certainly not total utilization of the
tree.
Furthermore, the small Ir.ills actually were not capable of full
utilization of the trees at this time for they had equipment capable only
of rough sal'ling lumber. In this respect they probabl;r can not be blamed"
for not wanting to take either the smaller logs of "Douglas Fir or the
supposedly inferior species of the Northwest forest, such as hemlock and
the true firs .11 . However, the operators can be held responsible for
their practice of leaving these logs and trees in the woods l.Jhere they
9Ralph W. Andrews and Darius Kinsey, This Was Logging (Seattle:
Superior Publishing Co., 1957), pp. 36-38.
lONe1son Courtlandt Brmin, Logging Principles and Practices (Uet,f York:
Wiley & S6n~, 1934), p. 90.
IlDoug1as Fir is actually a sp~cies tHlto itself. The true firs
belong to the Abies family.
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became prime targets for insects, disease, and fire.
The lack of conservation coupled with the problems of manufactur-
ing and marketing all combined to frustrate the early lumbermen of the
Pacific Northwest. Becc.use of these many and varied problems confront-
ing the industry in this region at the close of the nineteenth century,
the outlook for the future was highly questionable. The natural resource
was available in a quantity and quality which far surpassed former lum-
bering areas. However, it appeared that the lumber industry was to
remain relatiyely small and mostly local in scope Qnless the opportunity
to overcome the basic p~oblems 6f the industry was provided to stimulate
growth. This 9Pportunity finally was given to the struggling industry.
One key to the s?lution of the problem came from within the industry it-
self as certain lwnbermen moved to integrate and organize the industry
in the Pacific Northwest. The other key was found in the changing policies
tmvard and the grovling interest i:q the Pacific Northwest region by the
transcontinental railroads. JfLfact, the emergence of the lumber giants
in the Pacific Northwest and the arrival of the transcontinental rail-
roads on the Coast were almost simultaneous and very definitely related.
CHAPTER IV
By the late 1800' s it 'tl&S apparent that the future econoinic
development of the Pacific Northwest hinged upon the development and
the policies of the major railroads which were by then nearing completion
and would link the region with the rest of the nation. Nore specifical-
~, the future of this region depended upon the policies and actions of
one man, namely James J .. Hill, for by the last decade of the nineteenth
century Hill was in control of both the Great Northern Railroad and the
Northern Pacific Railroad. The Great Northern, reaching from st. Paul
to the Puget Sound, was completed in 1893, and with its completion Hill
was confronted with the problem of creating enough freight business to
make the new railroad pay. He rose to the challenge, and his resulting
grandiose scheme encompassed not only the economy of the Pacific North-
west but also the economy of the rest of the United States and even that
of the Orient! Although never realized in its entirety, Hill's great
plan for linking the United States with the Far East through trade in
no small way added to his reputation as the Empire Builder. The key-
stone for the success of. the entire plan seemed to be the potential lum-
ber production of the Pacific North~'rest. As Hill himself explained his
scheme,
A·study of the lumber trade revealed the· first favorable opening.
~ihen the railways reached Puget Sound, they found there the largest
supply of standing timber in the world. For this there was at that
time but a limited market. It reached the outer world only in the
small quantities that sailing vessels carried up and drnvn the coast
or to foreign ports. The freight rate to the East, where alone it
could be sold extensively, where the demand for it was greatest, ~vas
ninety cents per hundred pounds. This was prohibitive. The question
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was how to make a rate low enough to bring this lumber to the prairie
country and the Hississippi Valley. It could be done only by secur-
ing an ample and steady volTh~e of traffic in both directions, so that
neither eastbound nor westbound cars should be hauled empty. Low I
rates can be made only if cars moving in each direction are loaded.
In the late 1800's the railroads were carrying much more to the
West than they were hauling eastward from the region. Lower freight
rates on Hest Coast lumber would solve this problem, but in doing so it
woul~ more than likely create an additional problem. Hill envisioned
i
such an increase in lumber shipments to the East and Niddle West as a
result of the lower freight rates tha.t the railroads would soon be ship-
ping empty cars westward. Assuming that such a problem would devel9p,
Hill reasoned that
• • • westbound business would have to be increased age.in, else
empty cars would be travelling nearly two thousand miles to the
Pacific Coast. Hhile the local development of the coast country l'laS
sure to be great, it would not supply sufficient volume of business
at that time to equalize traffic. A market for our products in the
Orient, if it could be built up, would not only do this but would
be of the utmost value to every interest in this country. • •• The
first steps had to be taken and the whole burden assumed by the rail-
roads. 2
According to Hill, the primary key to the success of his plan was
the establishment of a favorable freight rate for the West Coast lumber.
Taking into consideration the fact that in order to compete in the world
market American suppliers had to keep their prices reasonable and also
the fact t~at the anticipated volume of lu.mber freight might 'vell offset
any possible financial loss due toa lower freight rate, Hill decided
that he should take a gamble and lower the freight rates on lumber, at
IJames J. Hill, Highways of Progress (New York: Doubleday, Page, &
Co., 1910), pp. 158-59.
2Ibid ., pp. 159-60.
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least temporarily. He did Im·rer them even lower than suggested by the
lumbermen of the day, hoping to give the western region the economic
stimulus it needed to get on its feet. He justified this extremely low
rate in the following manner:
The lumber business of the Pacific Coast made possible the nruning
of a rate that should open to us the closed doors of the trans-
Pacific East. The details then worked out have not lost their inter-
est as a part of our economic history, although the splendid pos-
sibilities they revealed have gone.
At the beginning, the key to the situation was the lumber rate.
There were 400,000,000,000 feet of standing timber on the Pacific
Coast. It could not pay the ninety~cent freight rate to the East
at that time, when lumber prices were but a fraction of what they
are now (1910). The railroads could not afford to haul empty cars
West to carry that lumber East. It costs, roughly, $160 to haul a
car 2,000 miles across the continent. But they could afford to
carry lumber temporarily at a low rate rather than bring cars back
empty. And if in this way the lumber business could be developed,
it, in turn, would make possible later a low westbound rate, on
which trade with the Orient could be built up.
The lumber men of the Pacific Northwest said that \'lhile the ninety-
cent rate shut them out of the eastern market, they could pay sixty-
five cents and do business there. Harket conditions at that time
seemed, however, to require a rate of not to exceed fifty cents.
The railroads offered a forty-cent rate on fir and fifty cents on
cedar, and those rates went into effect. In 1900 the St&te of
'Washington produced 1,428,205,000 feet of lumber; only six years
later its product was 4;305,053,000, with a total value of $62,162,840.3
Hill did not have to search very far to find the most able repre-
sentative of the lumber in~ustry. In 1891 Frederick Weyerhaeuser had
moved to st. Paul, and his next door neighbor from 1893 until his death
in 1914 was Jim Hill. During the 1890's these two giants of American
industry spent many evenings discussing the mutual probl~ms of lumber-
ing and railroading in the ~'lest ,and out of these talks there eventual-
ly developed a friendship. and a bu~iness relationship \'lhich was to greatly
enhance the fortunes of both men and their respective business ventures' in
3 .Ibid., p. 163.
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the Pacific Northwest.4
Hill was not only concerned about such long term matters as how
he could build sufficient volW1"ie on his railroads so that they would
be profitable, but while the lines were still being "built, he was faced
with the reoccurring problem of obtaining proper finances for the actual
construction. As has already been pointed out, he placed his hopes for
the solution to the long range problem on the great potential lumber
"
business of the Pacific Northwest. The lumber industry also provided
one of the better answers to the more urgent question of financing the
building of the railroads, for it represented a ready customer for the
timber that Hill had acquired through the land grants given to his rail-
roads, particularly the Northern Pacific.
In time the eventual timberland purchases from Hill's Northern
Pacific Railroad by the Heyerhaeuser Timber Company were to be most
important to the groltrth of both the Hill interests and the ~'Jeyerhaeuser
empire. The Northern Pacific during its years of development and con-
struction had amassed a huge amount of land. The Federal Land Office
which controlled the allocation of land grants to the railroads seems
to have been most liberal in their efforts to encourage the builders
of the Northern Pacific to complete their tra.nscontinental line. In the
end the railroad had been" given the option on approximately 44,000,000
4Frederick jIeyerhaeuser's son, Frederick E. Weyerhaeuser, assumed
James J. Hill's directorship seat on the Board of the Northern Pacific
Railroad at the latter's death in 1916. Even today the close association
is still in evidence. Frederick K. Heyerhaeuser is at present a member
of the boa.rd of directors of both the Weyerhaeuser Co. and of the Great
Northern Railroad (Poor's Register of Corporations - 1966 (New York:
Standard & Poor's Corp., 1966), pp. 691 and 1674).
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acres of land along its proposed right of way. By 1910 it had patented
32,664,651 acres of this grant. The final settlement of the Northern
Pacific land gra.nt in 1941 showed that a total of 39,843,053 acres had
actually been patented. 5 Included in this acreage were vast tracts of
timberland, the o~mership of which made the railroad the nation's second
largest timber o~mer in 1900, surpassed only by the Southern Pacific
Railroad.
Since the Northern Pacific VTaS not in the logging or sawrnill busi-
ness, James Hill naturally "vas looking for lUillbermen vlho could and wouict
handle the job. For Hill the sale of these timberla.nds would solve both
his iL1ffiediate and his long range problems, for it would mean needed cash
and also the lumber manufactured from the timber would give the Northern
Pacific and the Great Northern the volume of freight needed to make
these transcontinental railroads pay.
Hill in his search for potential buyers of this timberland had to
look no farther than over his fence, for by the late 1890's his neighbor,
vJeyerhaeuser, could begin to see that the inexhaustible pine forests of
Minnesota would soon be exhausted, just as were those of Wisconsin,
Michigan, and Maine. However, Frederick Weyerhaeuser was no easy sale.
He and the members of his organization held serious reservations about
the ability of western lumber being able to compete· in' the midwestern
and eastern markets due to the pro,hibitive freight ra.tes., As has al-
ready been shmm, Hill anS1.'lered this question by eventually setting
very favorable freight rates for \'Jest Coast lumber on his lines, betting
5n•M• Ellis, liThe Forfeiture of Railroad land Grants, 1867-1894 11 ,
Mississippi_Va~ley Historical Review, June, 1946, LXXIII, No.1, p. 45.
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on volwne to make him the necessary profit.
Secondly, Weyerhaeuser guessed correctly that it would be more
expensive to log ~nd mill the Douglas Fir and other western species.
The logs were so large and the terrain so rugged that almost completely
different methods and equipment would have to be devised. Also, there
was a transportation problem between forest and sawmill which would
have to be solved, for unlike the streams and rivers of previous forests
the forest streams of the VJestwere too shallow and otherwise unsuit-
able for the log drive type of logging'. Only in northern Idaho were
there river conditions similar to Minnesota and Wisconsin. Elsewhere
in the Cascade Range and the Coast Range of mountains expensive logging
roads and railroads would have to be built.
The other worry of Weyerhaeuser w~s the possibility that since
he was also considering the opportunity to invest rather extensively
in timberlands in the South at this time, such financial adventures in
the distant and remote West might over-extend his group.
Hovlever, the combination of the 'choice western timber, the dvlin-·
~g midwestern timber supply, and the persistence of Hill in the end
sold Vleyerhaeuser on the \'Test. Timber and Nen records this initial
western sale in these words:
Then in 1900 came a transaction that startled the Hest • • • the
~leyerhaeu3er office announced the purchase from the Northern Pacific
of 900,000 acres of timberland at $6 dollars an acre • • • •
A little later this purchase' was to seem a colossal bargain. The
Bureau of Corporations within a dozen years estimated that in terms
of the probable c'ut the price Vias only ten' cents a thousand feet.
Nevertheless, at the time many thought the investment exceedingly
speculative •• In short, so great a purchase required courage. 6
6Hidy, Hill~ and Nevins, Timber and Men, p. 213.
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In reading this account, one gets the feeling that although the deal
was big and the accompanying risks in proportion to the money involved,
Weyerhaeuser and his associates had the great combination of courage,
foresight, money, and luck necessary to pull off such a bargin. One
senses no small ·amount of pride in the above account. Today, at least
within the lumber industry in general and within the Weyerhaeuser Com-
pany in particular, this timberland purchase is legend.
Unfortunately, the authors of Timber and Men and most Weyerhaeuser
people today fail to mention the historical backgroQDd leading up to
this land sale. Knowledge of this background puts the transaction into
perspective and gives a much better understanding of just how and pos-
sibly why such a colossal deal took place when and where it did.
By 1912 it was quite clear that the private o1~ership of the nation's
western timberlands had ·been concentrated to a large degree into the hands
of .just three concerns. Table 6 on the following page reveals an inter~
eating feature of the relationship betvreen the Northern Pacific Rail-
road and the ~'leyerhaeuser Timber Company. At this date the Northern
Pacific was in third place in private rnvnership of timberlands. It had
lost its second place rating to the ~\leyerhaeuser Timber Company through
the sales of vast amounts of its timberland to the latter firm., Although
some of the land transfers involved original land grants, many were sales
involving exchange lands. As such, much of the timber involved in these
sales was not timber .acquired directly from original land grants to the
railroad, but instead, it was on land which had been received in exchange
for land originally granted the Northern Pacific, much of which was
considered to be comparatively worthless.
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TABLE 6
'J.1INBER HOLDINGS IN THE PACIFIC
NORTffi·ffiST AND CALIFORNIA OF THE
THREE LARGEST PRIVATE OvnJERS - 19127
Southern Pacific Railroad
Weyerhaeuser Timber Company
Northern Pacific Railroad
Timberland
(acres)
3,841,816
1,903,995
2,979,023
Timber
(billion fee.!J.
105.6
95.7
36.2
In 1897 Congress passed the Pettigrew Arnendment to the Sundry
Civil Appropriations Act. This amendment pertained. directly to the
governrnent's land policy and stated
That in cases in which a tract covered by an unperfected bona fide
claim or by a patent is included within the limits of a public for-
est reservation, the settler or owner thereof may., if he desires to.
do so, relinquish the tract to the Government, and may select in lieu
thereof a tract of vacant land open to settlement not .exceeding in
area the tract covered by his claim or patent. 8
This is the famous Uland lieu" or '!forest lieu" law. For the holders of
the large land grants, such as the Northern Pacific, it meant that any
part of their land grant which was now or in the future included within
the boundaries of a. public forest reserve, i.e., a National Park or a
National Forest, could be exchanged for an equal amount of land from the
7U.S., Department of Commerce, The Lumber Industr;f- (1;fashington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1914), II,p. 69. Although the Southern
Pacific Railroad \vas in 1912 the largest private owner of timber in the
United States, it soon become second to the vleyerhaeuser Timber Company.
The Southern Pacific had to forfeit most of it$ vast Oregon land hold-
ings to the goverlli~ent in legal actions which began in 1913 and ended
in 1916. The southern Pacific lost its land on the grounds of alleged
violation of the conditions of its grants.
8The Statues of the United states of America: ~Iarch, 1897 t.o
}'larch 1899 (Hashington: u.s. Government Printing Office, .1899), XXX, p. 36.
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public domain. However, the legal interpretation of this new law
imposeq a further restriction on the terms of exchange which greatly
altered the effects of the law. It was ruled that land taken in lieu
of the original grant must be surveyed land. Because of this subsequent
restriction, there was little action taken by the various companies
holding such land for the first year or tV10 after the law was passed.
During the period between 1897 and 1900 there was a total of only
i
i
71,000 acres exchanged. 9
At this same time, however, Congress was also considering the
establishment of Mt. Rainier National Park in the State of ~{ashington.
Included within the proposed boundaries of this park were many thousands
of acres of the Northern Pacific's land grant. Hopeful of gaining more.
~avorable exchange terms than those granted by' the Pettigrew hnendment,
the representatives of the railroad successfully brought lobbying p~es-
sure to bear upon Congress. The final wording of the Mt. Rainier Nat··
io~al Park Act more than satisfied the hopes of the Northern Pacific
officials and also the lumbermen who were interested. A specific section
pertaining solely to the Northern Pacific '1as inserted to cover the
disposition of its indemnity lands within the nev.l park. This section
states
That upon execution and filing with the Secreta.ry of the Interior,
by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, of proper deed releasing
and conveying to the United States the lands in the reservation
hereby created, also the lands in the Pacific Forest .Reserve v.rhich
have been heretofore granted by the United states to said company,
whether surveyed or unsurveyed, and v.mich be opposite said company's
constructed road, said company is hereby authorized to select an
equal quantity of nonmineral public lands, so classified as non-
9Appleman, 'Timber Empire From the Public Domain tl , p. 202.
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mineral at the tinle of actual Government survey, which has or shall
be made, of the United States not reserved and to which no adverse
right or claim shall have attached or have been initiated at the
tinle of the making of such selection, lying within any State into
or through which the railroad of said Northern Pacific Railroad
Company runs, to the extent of the lands so relinquished and released
to the United States. IO
This law was most valuable to the Northern Pacific interests in
the subsequent disposal of their timberlands for several reasons. First,
the railroad could now exchange the land it held within the park bound-
I
ries i for either surveyed or unsurveyed lands. This meant that choice
timberlands in Washington and Oregon which had never been opened to public
entry could nOvf be exchanged in lieu of land held both within the new
park and also within the Pacific Forest Reserve. The effect was immedi-
ate. Other private mvners of timberland grants·asked for and received the
same concession regarding exchanges for either surveyed or unsurveyed
land, and during the year 1900 the total amount of acres exchanged by all
private ovmers jumped from 71,000 acres to 523,000 acres. ll The Northern
Pacific in particular began more and more to exercise its option Q~der
the new law to exchange its indemnity lands. Between 1899 and 1914
the railroad relinquished a total of approximately 450,000 acres of land
within the park or the Pacific Forest Reserve, comprised primarily of
comparativelY \vorthless mountain lands, for which some of the nation's
most valuable timberland was ~btain~d in'lieu.12
Second, the Ht. Rainier Act gave the Northern Pacific the right
to cruise the timber of any prospective lieu lands prior to any exchange.·
1~30 stat., p. 994.
llAppleman, "Timber Empire from the Public Dornain ll , p. 202.
12The Ltunber Industry:, I, p. 237
84
As a result, the railroad vIas able to gain an accurate estimate of the
llinount and condition of the timber on these lands before comuitting
itself to an exchange. Naturally, the most heavily timbered lands
received the prima.ry consideration, for the railroad ha.d little inten-·
tion of retaining such lands. Its eyes were focused on future sales to
the lumbermen.
A third and final significant feature of the law was that there
was no restriction placed on potential lieu lands in regard to vlhether
they should all fall within odd numbered sections. The original grant
had given the railroa.d only the odd numbered sections of land bordering
along its right-of-way. Since there was no such specific restriction
under the new Imv, the Northern Pacific or anyone who had purcha.sed
land lieu scrip from the railroad could choose both odd numbered and
even numbered sections of land. The significance of this feature vias
twofold. First, choice timberlands in even numbered sections were now
available • Secondly, it gave the potential O1Vl!-er the opportlmityto
block his timber stand which would make future logging operations much
more efficient and profitable.
Whether the Northern Pacific acted alone in these transactions or
whether Weyerhaeuser was the moving force has never been accurately
determined. Timber and Men strongly defends the innocence of both the
Northern Pacific and Weyerhaeuser:
Circunstances negate this theory (that the Northern Pacific and
Weyerhaeuser had plotted to scheme and pressured the government to
pass such favor'able legislation). The Northern Pacific land office
",as not concerned, and the ~'[eyerhaeusers • .' •. had no interest in
Northern Pacific lands. 13
13Hidy, Hill, and Nevins, Timber and Men, p. 293.
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In view of the events and personalities involved prior to and
following the passage of both the Pettigrew Amendment in 1897 and
the Nt. Rainier National Park Act in 1899 it is hard to take such an
assertion at face value. First of all, it ha.s already been pointed
out that Hill wa.s vitally concerned with the forest lands of the
Pacific Northwest and their obvious relationship to the success or
failure of his railroad ventures. As for Frederick \veyerhaeuser, to
say that he had no interest in the western forests in general and in
. the western forest holdings of the Northern Pacific in particular is
beyond belief. By·the 1890's Weyerhaeuser was the nation's foremost
lumberman, a.nd one of the reasons he had attained this position of
leadership was that he was interested in all timber anJ~here. His
close personal relationship with Hill during the 1890's and ea.rly
1900's not only made him aware of the Northern Pacific's vast holdings,
but it also gave v~eyerhaeuser's syndicate the inside track on future
sales of this timber. In fact, it is most significant that it was at
just this precise time (1897 to 1900) that the Heyerhaeuser people
began to show real interest in the possibilities of the Pacific North-
west region. In 1898 with the. incorporation of the .Coast LQ~ber Com-
pany and in 1899 with the organization of the Sound Timber Company
the Weyerhaeuser group w~de their initial ventures in the Pacific
Northwest lumber industry.14 These were made independent of any timber-
land purchases from the Northern Pacific Rail~oad.
Of great sugnificance too is the fact that the tremendous.
900,000 acre transaction between the railroad and Weyerhaeuser was
14Ibid ., p. 212.
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completed in 1900, just a year after the favorable terms of the
Mt. Rainier Act went into effect and the same year that the l,'le:ler-
haeuser syndicate organized the vJeyerhaeuser Timber Company with head-
quarters in Tacoma, Washington. ~ Included in these 900,000 acres were
some of the very same exchange lands from the Northern Pacific's in-
demnity holdings within the National Park and the Pacific Forest Reserve.
It is very likely that Weyerhaeuser supplied many of the timber cruisers
to cruise the prospective lieu land of the railroad since in many in-
stances the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company purchased not the lieu land
per se but lieu land scrip which could be exchanged for lieu land at
their convenience.
~ 1914 the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company had purchased a grand
total of 1,525,000 acres of timberland in the Pacific Northwest from
the Northern Pacific Railroad, including the original 900,000 acre
purchase. This amount constituted approxDnately eighty percent of the
company's entire land holdings. 15 Of this total, approximately 220,000
acres had been obtained through purchases of Gxchange land or land lieu
scrip which the Northern Pacific had received as a direct result of
the Mt. Rainier Act. Other Weyerhaeuser controlled companies acquired
an additional 97,000 acres of this land and/or scrip, making the total
Weyerhaeuser take approximately 317,000 acres or seventy one percent of
the approximately 450,000 acres exchanged by the Northern Pacific under
this lci.w. 16
Thus, the Heyerhaeuser group was able to accomplish in a fe\'f short
15The Lumber Industry, II, p. 7.
16Ibid~, I, p. 239.
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years what it had taken them some fifty years or more to achieve in
the Upper Midwest, namely gain ownership or control over vast amounts
of a given region's timber resource. Once again they proved to be the
most successful lwnber interest in the struggle to gain control over
the industry. - But there were also others who shared to some extent
the success of Weyerhaeuser in seizing the opportunity to carve out
empires from the timberlands originally given to the western railroads.
In Oregon the well knovffi early lumber concerns of Booth-Kelly, of
C.A. Smith,and of A.B. Harrrrnond were the principal benefactors from
the disposal of the vast holdings in the state of the Southern Pac-
ific Railroad. 17 The Northern Pacific, in addition to the Weyerhaeuser
Timber Company purchases, sold timberlands to the Smith and Harrm10nd
interests. Also, the Shevlin interests, another early Pacific North-
west lumbering power,were able to gain a large concentration of
timberlands through the Northern Pacific sales.18 In fact, most, if
not all, of the present day major lumbering and wood products firms in
the Pacific Northwest can trace the reason for their favored industrial
position in terms of ownership of timberlands either directly or in-
directly to the early generosity and cooperation of these railroads.
Even firms such as Georgia-Pacific Corporation and the U.S. Plywood
Corporation, which are relatively new giants in the i.ndustry, owe their
size to the fact that they have been able to purchase large tracts of
forest lands from such concerns as Booth-Kelly and C.A. Smith \~len
these latter firms ceased operations.
17Ibid_o, II, ppo 56-58.
18Ibid 0' I, p 0 239.
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~'Jhether these original transactions were all legitimate
and were free of any conspiracy to rob the public domain of a valuable
. natural resource for the finanical gain of a few or whether there act-
ually was illegal collusi.on for personal gain on the pa.rt of both the
railroads and the lumbermen has never been proven. As with other in-
dustries at the turn of the century, the luniller industry came under
heavy fire from the muckrakers and others in an effort to establish the
blame for the rapidly dwindling amount of forest land in the public
domain. The seemingly mysterious circumstances surrounding some of
the huge timberland sales which concentrated the nation's forest wealth
in the hands· of a select few plus the awakening fear that these fevr
would continue in the West the same wasteful lumbering practices which
had been the rule in the East and Upper 1fid~rest aroused the clamor of
the general public for reform. This clamor on the part of the public
led men of authority, namely Teddy Hoosevelt and Gifford Pincho~ who
was the head of the newly created U.S. Forest Service, to investigate
and regulate the so-called Timber Barons. President Roosevelt moved
rapidly to place remaining unclainled tllfiberlands into federal reserves
through the creation of the National Forest system. He also authorized
the creation of the Bureau of Corporations within the Department of
Corrunerce for the expressed purpose of examining the activities of the
nation's n~jor business concerns. One of the first jobs of this new
bUreau was to conduct an extensive investigation of the lumber industry
. to determine the precise arriount of concentration in the industry. The
results of this study are found in the four volume, 1,498 page mono-
gram, The Lumber IndustI.l, published in 1914. This study sho\tled that
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there was definitely a concentration of timberland ovmership in the
hands of a small number of firms. However, no conclusions are reach-
oed as the the legality of such concentration. Although there were
marlY transactions which could be questioned in regard to their concern
for the good of the general public, this report places little or no
actual blame on anyone group. Instead, it implies that the concentra-
tion resulted from a combination of many factors, including a general
apathy on the part of the-public, loosely worded and loosely enforced
legislation, and extremely shrewd businessmen whose expanding business
fortunes were acquired for the most part quite legally in respect to
the existing social, economic, and political ethics of the period.
In retrospect it is interesting to reflect upon the dreams of
James Hill. Although parts of his master plan were never realized,
the belief that the development of the Pacific Northwest hinged upon
the success of the lumber industry was proven almost as soon as the
railroads reached the Coast and made the necessary concessions to.
generate and inspire confidence in the lumbermen to invest extensively
in the region. The development of the Pacific Northwest is a prline
example of the concept expressed by one author that "Communication,
not production, was the key to industrialism in the United States. n19
This was doubly true in the Pacific Northwest. First of all, without
the transcontinental railroads Itnking the region with the more popu-
latedparts of the nation the lu~ber industry of the area was doomed
to be rather provincial and consequently small. Secondly, the lrilli.ng-
19T.C. ° Cochran and H. Hiller, Age of :Enterprise (New York:
Macmillan, 1952), p. 57.
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ness of the railroads to part with their choice timberlands in the
region allowed the lumber industry to immediately concentrate a large
share of its power in the hands of a few, thus eliminating many of the
problems the industry faced while becoIT~ng established in other areas
of the cOill1try__ In short, the railroads opened the Pacific Northwest
for the lumber industry which in turn developed to sustain the operation
of the railroads.
The actions of the railroads worked miracles in transforming the
fledgling lumber industry of the Pacific Northwest into a major industry.
The primary effect of the large timberland purchases by the lumbermen
from the railroads in the first y-ears of the twentieth century was that
it constituted the initial step in the concentra.tion of' power within the
industry. ~~ership of such vast reserves of the natural resource
opened the door for more efficiency in logging c_nd milling practices.
The primary effect of the lower freight rates was that now the lumber-
men of the West could share in the hugh domestic lumber market of the
East and of the Midwest. These new rates paved the way for more ag-
gressive marketing efforts, particularly on the part of those lumbermen
who could provide the greatest supply. These new considerations made
the large, integrated. operation practical.
The transformation in the Pacific Northwest did not take place
immediately, however. The hugh timberland purchases by such concerns
as lleyerhaeuser, C.A. Smith, and the others temporarily drained their
finances, and for the first few yea,rs of the 1900's the older, more
established mills in the area continued to lead in lumber production.
Production figures for 1905 reveal that the St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber
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Company and the Pope and Talbot mills led the indust.ry in the Pacific
Northwest with a total lumber production for the year of 125,000,000
board feet and 84,000,000 board feet respectively. In contrast, the
total production of the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company in 1905 was a
meager 39,000,000 board feet of lumber. 20
These production figures are not only significant in that they
shm'l the size of the e2.rly mills, but they also reveal that a definite
change was imminent within the industry, at least in respect to market
orientation. By 1905, the new low freight rates were in effect, and
although the cargo business was still primary, it was apparent that the
rail market held the greater possibilities, at least for those mills
with rail connections. In 1905 Pope and Talbot with their twin tide-
water mills at Port Gamble and Port Ludlow, Vlashington, shipped ninety
percent of their production via cargo. 21 Weyerhaeuser's lone mill at
Everett, Washington, which had been purchased in 1902, shipped approx-
imate1y sixty percent of its 1905 - 1910 production by rail to the
Upper Vddwest. 22 Since many of the tidewater cargo mills had poor rail
connections, they had to remain cargo mills, and as a result their grm'lth
was stymied. In contrast, the mills with good rail connections began
20];.T. Coman and Helen N. Gibbs, Time, Tide, and Timber (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1949), p. 446. The comparative smallness of
these early mills in the Pacific Northvfest is brought sharply into focus
when it is noted that Heyerhaeus"er Company: s current operation at Long-
vie"'l, ldashington, is capable of cutting approximately 1, OUO, 000 feet of
lumber in a single day! In 1964 the total llimberproduction of ~reyerhaeuser
was 1,607,000,000 board feet (Weyerhaeuser Co., Annual Report - 1961t
(Tacoma: vJeyerhaeuser, 1964), p. 32.).
21Coman and Gibbs, Time, Tide, and Timber, p. 446.
22Hidy, Hill, and Nevins, Timber and Hen, p. 233.
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to concentrate on the California and J·lidwest markets now that the;y. could
compete in regard to price-. So great a factor \faS this opportunity to
I
increase rail business that \~eyerhaeuserfsEverettmill in the period
between 1905 and 1910 chose to ship only ten percent of its total pro-
duction via carg.o. 23 All indications pointed to a major change in the
organization of the Pacific Northwest lumber industry.
23Ibid.
CHAPTER V
vfuat occurred within the lumber industry in the Pacific North-
west region from 1905 on was mu~h the same sort of consolidation of
power that had occurred in the Upper Mississippi Valley after many
year~ of individualism on the part ~f the separate lumbermen. In the
I
western region the concerns which were to grow the most and in doing
so become the most powerful were generally some of the smne ones who
had initiated the ideas of cooperation and trust in the Midwest. Using
the experience and financial power they had acquired from their 1-Hnne-
sota, Hisconsin, and ~4ichigan ope!,'ations, these few lumbermen were able
to take the best advantage of the conditions in the Pac~fic North1tlest.
at the turn of the century. Once they got control of the major share
of the region's tL~berlands and began building their larger, more mo~ern
sawmills, these new concerns began. B: growth ~rhich far surpassed that
of the older mills in the region, and as a result the lumbering industry
itself began to take on a newer, more modern look. Although the small
operations certainly did not fade completely away in the face of the
new competition, the few large timberholders and mills .rapidly became
the real heart of the industry.
As these lumber giants began to emerge, it vlas evident that only
one held the key to achieving any real dom1nance over the entire in-
dustry. This firm was the Heyerhaeuser Timber Company. Realizing that
the'main factor in the success or failure of a lumber company is the
degree of control it has over the raw material, 1'Ie~yerhaeuser and his
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cohorts with their vast purchases from the railroad timberland hold-
Iings now held the necessary timber reserves needed to assure success
in the years to co~e. As had been the case in Wisconsin and !1innesota,
the \veyerhaeuser syndicate could now proceed at their o~m pace to
build their lumber empire in the \\Test. In time this western operation
of the ~veyerhaeuser group Has to far surpass their midl"restern ~chieve­
ments. In fact, the success of the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company was so
I
outstanding compared with their competitors that any study of the con-
centration of power within the. lumber industry ,of the Pacific Northwest
must in reality be a study of the development of the \~-eyerhaeuser firm.
As \'las seen in the preceeding chapter, the lveyerhaeuser Timber
Company spent the early years of the 1900's buying up as much choice
timberland as it could find. The firm and its leaders were often over-
extended financially with these purchases, and often they were accused
of hording the timberlands, buying and holding solely for the purpose
of reselling later at large profits. This attitude of their opponents
seemed justified when the firm made no major attempts to acquire milling
operations during the initial years of its existence. However, Weyer-
haeuser and his friends had no such intentions ",They were not going
~1€st merely to speculate, nor were they intending to become merely a
timberland management operation in the Pacific Northvrest. Contrary to
their competitor's and opponents' beliefs, the \~eyerhaeuser Timber Com-
pany had as its ultimate objective the manufacture of lumber. l
The fact that it took the 'firm some fifteen years to cement its
basic position in the region before it began to manufacture lumber on a
\
IHidy, Hill, a.nd Nevins, Timber and Nen, p. 278.
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large scale is indicative of the caution, planning, and thoroughness of
Frederick ~{eyerhaeuser. From his earlier experiences, he knew that the
success and longevity of his western operations depended upon having
adequate timber reserves. Weyerhaeuser and his associates also grasped
the fact that these timber reserves had an added significance in the
West for it was the last ren~ining stand of commercial timber left in
the United States. If the Weyerhaeuser Tj~ber Company was to be a per-
manent establishment, it would require a vast reserve of timber. For
these reasons, Weyerhaeuser was willing-to forgo imrnediate profits,
concentrating instead on timberland acqu~sitions.2
From 1900 to 1915 the vfe;>Terhaeuser Timber Company concentrated its
efforts on expan~ing, consolidating, and organizing its timber reserves.
The great purchases from the Northern Pacific Railroad needed to be
cruised, and t~eir true value and natUre assessed. Inferior tracts of
timber needed to be traded or sold for more choice stands. The checker
board effect of the railroad grant presented the firm with the problem
of exchanging odd sections of land for even sections with the railroads,
.
the government, and other timber owners. The results of all of these
early efforts in timberland management were obvious when the company
finally decided to make the venture into the manufacturing field. By
-1915 \~Teyerhaeuser knew what it had in the itTay of raw material. This
control, organization, and knowledge of the resource was to prove in-
2It has been said that Frederick Ueyerhaeuser trvrould buy timber
anywhere, but would sell none" (Holbrook, Holy Old l'lackinaH, p. 157.).
Although this is not quite accurate, it is true that ~{eyerhaeuserrs
philosophy concerning the acquisition of timberlands was probably the
basic reason for the success of his business ventures. In reality, he
often did sell some of his tinmer holdings, but they were almost always
sold at Weyerhaeuser's terms.
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valuable to the firm in its drive to the top of the industry.
vfuile they were organi~ing their timberland domain, the leaders
of the \ieyerhaeuser Timber Comprony were proceeding with a careful anal-
ysis of the manufacturing end of the industry in anticipation of their
future ventures in this aspect of the business. In 1902 Wey-erhaeuser
purchased the assets of the Bell-Nelson Mill Company of Everett, Wash-
ington, for the expressed purpose of using it as a pilot manufacturing
unit.3 With this small mill the company was able to gain valuable in-
formation on logging and manufacturing methods and costs. With this
informa.tion they were later able to plan their manufacturing units with
with the most efficiency possible. In doing so, Weyerhaeuser was thus
able to bypass many of the manufacturing problems which plagued its
competitors. For instance, the initial operation at Everett brought to
light the problem of inefficiency in trying to cut the varied species
of the Pacific Northwest forests. In "addition to the Douglas Fir~ there
were other species of commercial value including Western Red Cedar,
West Coast Hemlock, and Sitka Spruce. All were in demand by 1910 and
were worth the effort to mill. However, the various species were not
innerchangeable in the production flow of a mill due to their different
characteristics, varied sizes, and the end products nlade from each wood.
On the strength of their -studies at the Everett mill, "Weyerhaeuser's
leaders planned many of their futu!e nlill-sites to include not one saw-
mill, but two or even three mills, each cutting a different species or
a different size of "log. The resulting efficiency in production justified
3Hidy , Hill, and Nevins, Timber and Ken, p. 221.
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the experiment.4 This concept and many other manufacturing innovations
were the result of the Everett project.
Also, with this mill Weyerhaeuser was able to make a careful study
of the marketing phase of the business. Everett vias a station on the
recently completed Great Northern Railroad, and for the first decade
or so of its existence Weyerhaeuser Tbnber Company was able to see the
exact possibilities of the new rail trade. Questions concerning such
things as the acceptability of the western species in the eastern markets,
the best product lines, and prices were all answered to a large degree
as the Everett mill offered most of its modest output to the rail nBrket.
This extensive market survey gave the ~;Jeyerhaeuser officials additional
information vlhich allovred them to build mills which could and would con-
centrate on the production of certain lumber items at the expense of
the full product line. 5 Thus, Weyerhaeuser was eventually able to
coordinate their various mills so that the company was not onlyade-
quately covering the demands of the market but also" making almost full
4Weyerhaeuser's largest mill site was built at Longview, Washington,
.and included three separate sawmills involved in lumber production •. Nill
#1 has cut large, old growth Douglas Fir exclusively for the past forty
years. Mill #2 cuts the smaller, second growth Douglas Fir and all hem~
lock sent to the mill •. Mill #3 cuts only cedar and is the smallest of the
three mills since not only is the cedar production the. smallest but also
the cedar logs seldom exceed sixteen feet in length. Vleyerhaeuser's Long-
view operation also has a separate milling facility for cutting hardwoods,
such as red alder and maple, but this is of minor importance compared
with the softwood lumber business of the mill.
5For instance, although a large Weyerhaeuser mill, such as Long-
view, would be producing the full product line of the company, a smaller
mill, such as the ~Ieyerhaeuser plant at Enumclaw, Washington, could
take complete advantage of the smaller timber in that area and produce
primarily dimension lumber, i.e., 2 x 4's through 2 x 12 15. The company
would thereby be servicing not only the entire demand of the market but
would also have a greater quantity of the items most in demand. .
('
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use of its timber resource. It was a masterful bit of planning which
in the long run paid the firm handsome rewards which more tha.n offset
any short term Ipsses which it may have incurred because of the seem-
ing hesitancy of the company to enter ,.,rholeheartedly into the manufact-·
.uring phase of the Pacific Northw~st lumber business.
By 191.4 the consensus among the company's management was that
the time had finally come when further delay of large scale ma.nufa.ct-
ure of lumber Hould not be wise. Several things led it to this deci-
sion. Since the origina.l large timberland purchase in 1900 the Weyer.;..
haeuser people had felt a growing com~itment .to the railroads in general
and. to the Northern Pa9ific Railroad in particular to provide the east
bound lumber shipments which the railroads so desired. vJith Heyerhaeuser
by far the largest timberland owner among the lumber concerns on the
Coast, the rai~roads unrelentingly applied pressure on the Tacoma based
concern to start producing lumber, pointing out the fact that the pri-
mary reason that allowed \-leyerhaeuser to accumulate so vast a domain
in the first place was that the railroads were willing to relinquish
their abundant timberland holdings at bargain prices in order to generate
·the east bound freight traffic which the~y so desparately needed to in-
sure the success of their transcontinental lines. Although these tDnber-
land transactions were strictly business deals to V'ieyerhaeuser and as
such carried no specific commitmen~ to the railroads to produce lmaber,·
the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company did feel at least a moral obligation to
help the railroads·. 6 The original friendshiI? betvreen James Hill and
Frederick Weyerhaeuser still prevailed, and the le~ders of the various
6Hidy, Hill, and Nevins, Timber and Hen, p. 275.
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companies could see the wisdom of cooperation.
In addition to this factor, the \veyerhaeuser group more than any
other lumbering firm in the region could see_the great marketing pos~
sibilities offered by the combination of the continued demand for lumber
,in the ~lidwest and of the greatly. reduced freight rates on lumber. Hold-
ing the best and the most timber in the nation in their new forest lands,
it is logical to assume that Heyerhaeuser could produce the most lurrber
in the industry if they ever decided to inaugurate manufacturing on a
major scale. By 1910 several of the directors -of the firm felt that time
was running out to cash in on the freight rates then offered by the rail-
roads. As has already been. pointed out, these low rates were originally
intended to b~ only temporary, to be readjusted at the discretion of the
railroads. These Weyerhaeuser officials wanted the company to expand
its manufacturing facilities immediately in order to take advantage of
these rates and thus gain a foothold in the Midwest rail market.? If
7The size and importance of the Mid\<rest lumber market can not be
overestimated i.n any study of either the lumbering business of the Upper
~lidwest or that of the Pacific Northwest. Frederick Weyerhaeuser him-
self once admitted that he would rather have the State of Iowa's lumber
business than that of any other three states combined (Stewart H. Holbrook,
'Stor~ American Railroads (New York: Crown, 1947), p. 182.). Although
this was probably an exaggeration, the following lumber consumption
statistics of various states over the years dq reveal the importance of
the midwestern states to the early lumbermen. In 1915 Iowa received
3.. 89% and Illinois received 7.91% of all soft\<rood lumher shipments in the
nation (U.3., Department of Agriculture, The Distribution of SoftHood .
Lumber in the Middle West (\1ashington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1917), p. 95.)"
In 1935 Iowa received a tremendous 13,9% of all lumber shipped
from the Dougla.s· Fir region in the Pacific North\1est (Hest Coast Lumber
Associatiqn, Hest Coast Lumber Facts (Seattle: ~tIest Coast Lwnber As-.
sociation, 1936), p. 9.). During the past thirty.years the exodus of
the midwestern farmer for the urban areas and the tendency of the re-
maining farmers to expand their land holdings \1hile at the same time
reducing their buildings have combined to curtail drastically the once
jIlsatiable demand for lumber of the Midwest in general and the mid"Vlestern
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the Vleyerhaeuser Timber Company was ever to grovl in manufacturing to"
the size needed to best utilize its vast timber holdings, the second
decade of the twentieth century appeared to be the best time to begin
the project.
Closely related to the opening of the rail market of the Midwest
as a major factor in the decision of Weyerhaeuser to expand its manu-
facturing was the anticipated opening of the Panama Canal. Completed
in 1914, the Canal opened the door to great possibilities to expand
f
cargo shipments of lumber from the Pacific Northwest to the. large metro-
politan centers along the East Coast. At first these new cargo oppor-
tunities represented another reason why Weyerhaeuser should expand into
lumber manufacturing on the v:est Coast. The more markets available, the
greater the possibility of developing a successful, large lumbering
operation. In time, this cargo market along the East COB,St which re-
suIted from the Panama Canal became so lucrative for Weyerhaeuser that
farmers in particular. The following figures from the Statistical Year-
book - 1963 of the Hestern Hood Products Association (Portland: lIestern
Vlood Products Association, 1964,p. 12.) compare the leading states re-
.ceiving shipments of lumber from the Douglas Fir region with Iowa and
Illinois during the early 1960
'
5:
1960 1961 1962 1963
California 8.6% 10.1% 8.9% 9 .8J~
Illinois 3.6% 3.8% J.6;b 3 .2J~
Iowa 2.7% 2.4% 1.9% 1.67&
Oregon 7.9% 6.8% 7.6% 8.1%
Texas 4.5% 5.2;b 5.07~ 4.5%
~\lashington 8 .6~b 8.6% 10.0% 9.9%
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they 'developed their ,mill steamship company whose freighters delivered
1'leyerhaeuser lwnber from the v'Jeyerhaeuser mill in \<Jashington and Oregon
to the Weyerhaeuser remanufacturing plants and distribution centers
along the East Coast.
Another very positive factor in deterrrQning the Weyerhaeuser
Timber Company's ultimate decision to plQ~ge deeply into manufacturing'
was the simple fact that their original pilot mill at Everett was prov-
ing that manufacturing West Coast lumber was a sound policy.8 Not only
was this mill discovering new, efficient methods of lumbermanufactur-
ing in the areas of sawing, drying, milling, and shipping but:as import-
ant was the fact that the Everett opera.tion sho"lred an encouraging sales.
growth along with a corresponding' grm<rth in production betl,veeh tpe years of
1902 to 1913, as seen in Table 7 on the following page. Even if the
company had decided to forego large scale manufacturing operations,
they would have had to at least expa.nd the Everett mill to handle the
increa.se in its business.
Finally, the directors of ~i[eyerhaeuser had reached the conclu--
Sion that something dramatic should take place to halt once and for all
the mounting public criticism of the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company. As
the years passed and Weyerhaeuser added to its immense tirr~er domain
in the Pacific Northv.rest without developing its manufacturing phase
to a corresponding level, the American public grew more and more fear-
ful that the company had no other intention but to hold the timber un-
til the market was favorable and then sell it at great profit. The
muckrakers, such as Gustavus }trers, were quick to reveal the supposed
8
Hidy, Hill, and Nevins, Timber and Nen, p. 275.
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situation to the public in ra.ther one-sided exposes.9 However, public
opinion against the large lumber firms in the West was also being shaped
by the much more impartial reports, such as the aforementioned Bureau
of Corporations' report of 1914, which offered concrete facts to sub-
stantiate the theory that the largest holders of timber were cutting
ver:l little of it. The implica.tion was that these "timber barons If were
intending to hold the timber as long as possible in order to gain the
vast profits which would certainly accrue with the continued grmrth of
the country.
TABLE 7
LUMBER PRODUCTION OF
THE WEYERHAEUSER TIM~COMPANY,
. 1902 - 1913
Production Sales
(Hillions of bd. ft. ) (Gross amoun"U
1902 27 $308,000
1903 19 286,000
1904 37 403,000
1905 39 488,000
1906 40 691,000
1907 40 744,000
1908 29 406,000
1909 48 724,000
1910 50 803,000
1911 61 814,000
9Hyers, History' of the Great .American Fortunes, pp. 689-9~.
10Hidy, Hill, and Nevins, Timber and Men, pp. 594 and 648.
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TABLE 7 - Continued
1912
1913
Production
(Millions of bd. ft.)
70
76
Sales
{Gross amount)
$1,007,000
1,150,000
As if these accusations were not enough, the mere size of the
Weyerhaeuser Timber Company made it extremely vulnerable to public
criticism from many other directions as well. Its great size when com-
.pared to other firms in the region made Weyerhaeuser the most likely
J
scapegoat upon which the public could vent its ire in reaction to such
things as the negative fluctuations of the area's econoL\r, labor problems,
forest fires, and improper conservation practices. ay 1914 these pres-
sures on the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company were becoming so great that a
decision on company manufacturing policy could be postponed no longer.
This factor coupled with the company's obligation to the railroads, the
great potential of the }tidwest lumber market, the new sales possibilities
offered by the opening of the Panama Canal, and the success of the Ever-
ett experimental mill all combined to tip the company's hand in favor of
large scale manufacture of lumber. The decision was made, and·in
May, 1914 work was begun on a huge, all-electric sa1~11 adjoining the
existing original mill at Everett, 1tIashington.
With the completion of the Everett B mill in 1915 and with the
opening of the new mill at Snoqualmie Falls, ~1ashington, t'l,,!o years later,
. .
the \',Teyerhaeuser Timber Company was definitely comnlitted to a major
manufacturing effort. From this start the company continued to add other
milling units in western Washington and Oregon until it had eleven separ-
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ate mill sites producing lumber. These range in size from the Cot-
tage Grove, Oregon mill with an annual capacity of 60 million board
feet of lumber to the vast Longview, Washington, operation which is
capable of producing approximately 310 million board feet of lumber a
year. In addition to these mills which are o\1lled and operated by the
Weyerhaeuser Company, the individual members of the Weyerhaeuser family
and their associates within the lumber syndicate have long held control-
ling interests in Potlatch Forests, Inc. and the Boise-Cascade Corporation. ll
Both of these Idaho based companies have dominated the lumber scene in their
respective regions for many years. Potlatch Forests controls the country's
last virgin stand of white pine in northern Idaho, while Boise-Cascade has
substantial holdings in southern Idaho, Hashington, and Oregon.
In addition to this great growth in and their dominance over the
lumber industry of the entire Pacific Northwest, thelJeyerhaeuser group
has also extended its holdings in other fields related to timber proces-
sing, such as plywood manufacture and paper .production. The firm's two
recent mergers, one with Roddis Ply\vood Corporation in 1960 and the other
with Kieckfefer Eddy Paper Company in 1957, added extensive facilities to
Weyerhaeuser's original holdings in these product areas •. Although not
directly related with lumber production, the company's diversification
in its product line has greatly added to its ability to make full use of
its timber resource, thus adding eyen more strength to its position of
leadership in the lumber industry.
However, the extent of vleyerhaeuser r s particular gro-w'th and success
11
. ~The corporate name vfas changed in 1959 from the Heyerhaeuser
Timber Compa.ny to the Heyerhaeuser Company.
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in the Pacific Northwest is not the prime consideration of this paper.
Of greater relevance to the theme is an examination of the reasons why
the big lumber producers, such as Weyerhaeuser, were able to succeed
and grow when others remained small. As has already been mentioned,
the key factor in the success or failure of any lumber manufacturer is
the availability of accessible timber. Many companies, such as Pope
and Talbot and Long-Bell, showed momentary signs of permanence and
industrial dominance, only to eventually have their growth stifled
because of a lack of sufficient timber reserves. An analysis of their
failings would reveal the fact that they originally placed their prime
emphasis on the development of manufacturing facilities at the expense
of acquiring the nec~ssary timber reserves needed to support- a large
manufacturing operation on a permanent basis. In comparison, the lumber
companies in the Pacific Northwest, such as vJeyerhaeuser, who placed
initial emphasis on the acquisition of large timber reserves and then
turned to the development of manufacturing were the firms that eventually
gained a position of permanent leadership in the lumber industry of the
region.
However, there was more to success than just acquiring timber
reserves. vlliat was done with these timberlands after their acquisit-
ion was also an important factor in the future of a lumber company.
Again, using the methods of the Weyerhaeuser Timber-Company as an- example,
it is obvious that the period of time between the initial timberland
purchases in the Vlest and the establishment of major manufacturing sites
vias not spent in idle vlays. From 1900 to 1915 a.nd even in the yea.rs
which followed, Weyerhaeuser actively persued a plan of organizing their
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forest holdings in such a way that when they did move into manufactur-
ing they would have almost total control over the timber of a given
a.rea.
Blocking up their extensive and widespread holdings which were
arranged in a checker board pattern over western vvashignton and Oregon
due to the nature of the original land grants, the VJeyerhaeuser firm
traded odd sections of land for even ones with the government and the
other private land holders until it either had complete O\mership of all
sections, both odd and even, within a given forest area or until it at
least ovmed enough sections so as to actually have control over the
timber in the immediate vicinity which the company did not own. This
latter situation often occurred when Weyerhaeuser was able to complete-
ly enclose the area of a competitor's land with their (Weyerhaeuser's)
land, thus in effect negating the ownership of the enclosed land. Ac-
cording to the 1914 government study of the Pacific North~'lest lumber
industry,
The Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. in western Washington ••• bought
large areas of Northern Pacific lands • • • all in such a way as
to secure not only actual ownership of a very large proportion of
the timberland in the regions where their holding lie, but a very
considerable measure of additional power by control.
In western Washington the Weyerhaeuser Timber Co••••"is said
to practically control the timber situation throughout large stretches
of country - for example in the southern part of Pacific County, or
in Lewis COlUlty.12
Not only did Heyerhaeuser t~ade for better land arrangements, but
contrary to the belief of many, the company actually sold considerable
blocks of its timberland in order to consolidate "its holdings. However,
it was seldom if ever done unless Weyerhaeuser could use the sale to its
12rhe L~ber Industry, II, p. "13.
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advantage either in respect to profit or to generate a larger, better
situated timberland purchase. The authors of Timber and Men relate that
George Long, the We;yerhaeuser firm's first general manager, was 0.1-
ways ready 8lld willing to :sell COTilpany lands that did not fit into the
company's plans, particularly when these sales would facilitate buying
in more advantageous places. By 1904 Long had actually sold a total of
35,000 acres of either timberland-- or timber rights.
i
Th€se transactions effected a double effect. They blunted the
edge of popular suspicion of the \·\jeyerhaeuser interests (i.e., that
lJeyerhaeuser was a timbermonoply), and they also made a fair'
profit. The 35,000 acres ••• fetched ~-j)940,000, the company making
what seemed a large profit; and although the margin was less than it
appeared - for interest, taxes, and management costs had to be con-
sidered - it was liberal. 13
Assuming that much if not all of this acreage ~vas probably part of the"
1900 land purchase from the Northern Pacific Railroad '\fhich originally
cost the company. $6 an acre, the gross profit would be $730,000! Con-
sidering also the fact that these were the days before income taxes, the
authors of Timber and Nenseem to be "rather conservative in their estima.te
of the net profit.
The effect of all these dealings was that Weyerhaeuser soon found
itself in the position whereby it could actually control the major por-
tionof the lumber industry in a given area, even to the extent of freez-
ing out its competition completely if/the situation so dictated. As
one early competitor of Heyerhaeuser in the Pacific Northvfest found out
to his dismay,' '" ~'leyerhaeuser • • • absolutely controls all the timber-
land in this county (Pacific County, Washington). They are a hard com-
pany to deal with. You can not cross their land without paying thenl
13Hidy, Hill, and Nevins, Timber and Nen, p. 224.
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about what the land itself is worth.' n14
These variations of ~1eyerhaeuser's version of economic Darwinism
are most apparent in a study of the relationship between the firm and
the Long-Bell interests ~n the Longview, Wash~gton, area. In fact,
. the Vleyerhaeuser vs. Long-Bell struggle for supremacy in Longview was
typical of the emerging lumber giants in the Pacific Northwest and holds
within it and its results the real reasons for the growth and success of
the few large lumbering concerns which survived this and siInilar·strug-
gles.
In the early years of this century Robert A. Long controlled a
large lumber business in the South with headquarters in Kansas City,
~tissouri.15 ~ 1920.Long began to look to the West as his companyfs
resources in the South showed definite signs of depletion. However,
R.A. Long's idea of an operation on the West Coast was Q~ique in that
he wanted Long-Bell Lumber Company to create the ideal industrial lli1it
\'fhich l'fould include not only the timberlands and millsite but also the
entire t01V11 where the mill vias to be located. This complex was to be
set up on a permanent economic basis, and everything including the tOvlil-
site, was to be completely.planned in advance. After extensive surveys
~nlich studied the timber resources, the geographical and geological
possibilities, and also the general economic potential"of each area
under consideration, "Long chose th~ site of the present tovm of Long-
view, Washington, as the best possible location for his dream city.
After purchasing what were considered to be sufficient timberlands in
14The Lumber Industry, II, p. 14.
15Robert A. Long \vas no relation to Heyerhaeuser's George S. Long.
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the Mt. St. Helens area, Long-Bell began in 1923 to layout the tovm· of
Longview.16 R.A. Long's vision called for an eventual population of
100,000, and so the plans were made accordingly with extra wide streets,
large hotels, and all of the other necessary facilities needed to sup-
..
port this number o.f inhabitants. Unlike man~y of his contempora.ries in
the lumber business, R.A. Long did not wish for this new operation to
become a typical company to\1n, completely c?ntrolled by Long-Bell and
completely dependent upon the economic fortunes of the local Long-Bell
mill. In order to give the tmvn permanence, Long ~~ew that he must
interest other luniliermen and even other industries in the advantages of
locating in Longview. With this in mind he naturally turned to the
Weyerhaeus~r Timber Company, the largest timberland holder in the area,
as a prime prospect. Weyerhaeuser, after initial studies were completed,
decided to erect a mill at Longview in order to take advantage of their
vast Mt. St. Helens' timber holdi~gs which amounted to nearly thirty
billion board feet of prime timber. l3'J the time vJeyerhaeuser made their
decision, Long-Bell had erected what was considered to be the largest
sawmill in the world, capable of cutting 1,000,000 feet per day. ~J
1929 Weyerhaeuser had built their mill complex, which also was capable
of producing 1,000,000 feet per day. By 1958 the Long-Bell mill was
completely closed do~m, the immense lumber storage sheds being used for
the storage· of wheat and other grains. Meanwhile, the Weyerhaeuser mill
less than a mile.down the river continues to grow and shows all the signs
16Ar~iving on the Coast too late to get in on the bargmn timber
sales of the railroads, Long-Bell made their first timberland purchases
in 1920 for their purposed Longview venture. A total of 70,000 acres
was purcha.sed from the Heyerhaeuser Timber Company in the forests sur-
rounding Mt. st. Helens (McClellan, Longview, p. 6.).
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of the permanence which originally belonged to the Long-Bell mill.
How one giant could die while the other survived and continues
to grow is an interesting story. There are probably two primary reasons
why this happened. First, for all of his vision and busihess ability
{
·R.A. Long failed to surround himself with enough men of ability to carry
on the companyfs earlier successes. The higher levels of the management
group brought out to the West from Kansas City were the equal of any
group in the business, including the \1eyerhaeuser people. However,
Long and his associates did not continue to bring capable men into the
jobs of responsibility, and also these original company leaders, includ-
ing such men as Wesley Vandercook, W.H. Ryder, S.M. Morris, and R.A. Long
himself, failed to produce sufficient numbers of male offspring capable
of carrying on the company's traditions. As a result, when the original
leadership core began to age and pass from the scene a vacuum was created,
and Long-·Bell was left without proper leadership. ~-..reyerhaeuser,OIl the
other hand, not only continued to bring in good men from the outside, but
there '!,vas always a good supply of sons to fill the shoes of their fathers
and uncles. As has been noted previously,. Frederick Weyerhaeuser him-
self had four very capable sons, each one becoming in time a leader in
at least one segement of the organization. Today, the fourth generation
of some of the other original partners are most active in the management
of the Weyerhaeuser Company. This·positive, progressive leade~ship ~f
Heyerhaeuser was .a definite reason for its Longviel-'r success ,and Long...
Bellfs lack of this type of management was a prime reason for its even-
tual failure at the same location.
The second factor in the decline of Long-Bell \.ras the short sighted-:
III
ness of the finn in their purchases of tinillerland. Their troubles
actually began when they were forced to buy their original timberland
for their Longview plant from Weyerhaeuser at the latter firmls terms.
By 1930 Long-Bell began to realize that not only had they made" many of
"I
"their timberland purchases at top market prices and thus over-extended
themselves, but also much of the land they had acquired was situated in
areas where access to it was controlled by Weyerhaeuser_ Thus, Long-
Bell was at the mercy of their c~ief competitor. Weyerhaeuser was quick
to realize these conditions and merely had to sit back and wait for
Long-Bell to dry up both financially and in respect to its' raw mate- ...
rial supply. In regard to the land which Long-Bell had bought at top
market prices, this in part eventually was resold to Weyerhaeuser at
ber~ prices due to the formerls need for operating capital. l ? Other
sections of Long-Bell land in the st. Helens area were completely sur-
rounded by sections belonging to ~eyerhaeuser. v\fuen Long-Bell inquired
as to the possibility of gaining right-~~way through the Weyerhaeuser
property, it was usually refused. ~1eyerhaeuser explained their refusals
by reasoning that they must have sole control over which of their lands
were to be opened for logging, otherwise it would destroy their grand
scheme for total dollar realization of their timber. In other ,,,ords,
with some 500,000 acres of timber in the area, Weyerhaeuser could
e~sily cut "in another sector and thus starve Long-Bell out. In such
instances, Long-~ell coul4 do nothing but sellout to Weyerhaeuser at
the latter I s price.' }3"IJ 1949 Long-Belli s "original holdings in south-
. l?Weyerhaeuser often bought the land for less than Long-Bell
"originally paid for it (Hidy, Hill, and Nevins, Timber and Men, pp. 27g-79.
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1,1estern Hashington were largely depleted, and the firm was purchasing
the greater percentage of its log supply from independent loggers. ay-
1957 the pri.ce of these logs on the open market vias too prohibitive for
profitable lumber manufa~turing, and consequently Long-Bell was forced
ISto close its Longview mill completely. Neanv-rhile, Heyerhaeuser con-
tinues to log its "ten cents a thousand" logs!
The passing of Long-Bell's hugh operation in southwestern Wash-
ington is not unique. It has happened many times in the past to all
·types and sizes of lumber operations as they struggled to gain a foot-
hold in the Pacific Northwest lumber induatry and strove to achieve a
position of dorr~nance and a degree of permanence. As happened in other
lumbering regions, only the strong won any major share of power. Often
they.employed rather ruthless means to achieve their end goals. How-
ever, in the Pacific Northwest these goals of power and permanence had
an added meaning and were w-orth the added effort for those few fortunate
lumbermen who were able to persevere. The added significance of leader-
ship in the West was that it ·would also mean permanent leadership in
the nationwide lumber industry for all the years to come. This was
the final stand of the lumber industry, and those who had the foresight
to grasp this fact moved rapidly once the railroads had opened the
region. They correctly foresaw that the primary key to greatness and
permanence was the acquisition of·sufficient timber reserves and their
proper management, and they acted accordingly.
lSMcClellan, Longview, p. 153.
CHAPTER VI
With the ascendency of the few large lumber producers to a
position of leadership in the rapidly expanding lumber industry of the
Pacific Northwest, the basic patterns for modern l~~bering began to
develop. Naturally, many of the customs and methods of the industry's
earlier years were retained, but the circumstances dictated certain
radical changes in lumbering philosophy which in effect have greatly
altered the industry's development since the turn of the century. Most,
if not al~ of these changes can be traced to the integration and con-
centra,tion of industrial power into the hands of the large timber
processing firms of the Pacific Northwest.
To be sure~ the growth of these hugh lumber manufacturers did not
signal the end of the small, independent lumberman. Although the tend-
ency is often to think of such firms as l\[eyerhaeuser, Simpson, Potlatch
Forests, Boise Cascade, and Georgia-Pacific as being the giants of the
industry, they actually control only a relatively small part of the total
lumber business. Recent figures show that in 1964 there were nearly
33,000 separate lumber manufacturing establishments in the entire Unit-
ed States, ranging in size from Vleyerhaeuser to the sma.ll "gypOIl type
mill which comes and goes depending upon the prevailing lumbermarket. l
This figure clearly points out the fact that even though the few large
operators have gained control of large segements 'of the industry in
IV.S., Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the Unit-
ed states - 1964 (\vRshington: u.s. Gover~~ent Printing Office, 1964),
p. 688. .
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certain locals, no lumber monopoly or even oligopoly has developed to
completely dominate the industry. The very nature of the business
allows for the continued existence of the small independent producers.
In this respect the lmnber industry can be compared with farming.
80th are engaged in using the land to grow and harvest a renewable
crop. Because trees of commercial value can be grown a~nost anywhere
in the country and because all a man needs to become a lumberman is
!
I
a saw, it is easy to see why the industry has never been able to com-
pletely eliminate the marginal operator." Much the s~~e is true of
farming~ Although the trend in recent years ha~ been toward the large
farming operation with some even suggesting that farming eventually will
be done entirely on a large corporate type basis, the fact remains that
as long as men are independent and like to work the soil there will
probably be the small marginal operator in that industry, too.
- .-
In lumbering these smalleF independent operators have tradition-
ally been the source of many of the major problems of the industry.
Lack of conservation of the resource, instability of the lumber market,
lack of uniformity of manufacture, and other adverse aspects character-
istic of the industry throughout its long history can, in a great many
instances, be traced to the small independent lumberman. Even today after
a half century of relative stability in regard to the organization of the
industry, the smaller lumber firms are by their very nature rather un-
stable, short term operations. These firms continue to remain strictly
lumber producers, lacking the capital and/or the inclination to diver-
sify their product line to include timber products other than lumber.
As a result, their problems are multiplied. - Extremely sensitive to the
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whims of the lumber market, the small independents without a sufficiEmt
reserve of low priced timber must continually gamble on outside log
and timber purchases, hoping to buy their raw material cheaply'snd to sell
their lumber product at a good profit. Few of the smaller operators
possess this ability to analyze the market accurately, and even then
they find themselves at a distinct disadvantage. The larger firms with
their greater financial resources are able to consistently out-bid the
small firms for tracts of timber stumpage offered for sale by the state
and federal governments. One study made in 1960 revealed the following
breakdown of where lumber mills in western Oregon were acquiring their
respective log supplies:
TABLE g
Tll1BER SOURCES OF~\JESTERN OREGON SA1dMILLS - 19602
Class A Companies (Capaci~y of 120,000 or more feet a day)
51% Timber from company owned land
49% Timber from government timber sales
Class D Companies (Capacity of 40,000 or less feet a day)
901/0
91%
Timber from government timber sales
Timber from private timber sales, i.e., generally
scavenger timber sales from privately ~~ed com-
mercial forest land.
In summarizing the situation the author states that II obvious ly, the com·
panies in Class D most dependent on public timberland for their supply
of raw material were able to obtain actually only a widow's mite. 3
2Franklin Y.H. Ho, Small Lumber Companies in Hestern Oregon (v'.Jash-
ington: Small Business Administration, 1963), p. 5.
3Ibid •
---
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The result of this situation is that the timber processed by the
smaller firms is often inferior, lending itself to the manufacture of
Cl.n inferior product. Un'able to compete 1'lith the larger firms in respect
to quality, the small independents often must sell their lumber on price
'alone, sometimes even "dumping" their production on the market in order
to get enough money to continue their operations. The effect of this
type of marketing on the stability of the lumber price structure is often
quite adverse.
The effect on the sma.ll firms can have even greater consequences.
Their continual en~hasis on short term profit results in small profits
which in turn limit the business horizons of the firms. The operations
are relegated to the marginal level, and their management often reverts
to the traditional !tcut out and get out" policy of the industry's earlier
days with all of its negative aspects of timber management and lumber
manufacture. "Actually, the core ,of major problems (for the small lumber
concerns) centers on certain institutional and managerial factors, \'lhich
place smaller companies at a disadvantage in raw material procurement
,and in product ~elling. Relatively irregular production schedules re-
sult, which, in turn, further heighten raw materia.l procurement and
product selling problenls. The smaller companies, in effect, are caught
up in a vicious circle (often) leading to exhaustion and extinction. ,,4
Hmfever, to impl~y that there' is no longer a place for th~ small
independent operator or that their operations are entirely detrimental
to the continued wel1-being of lwnbering would be doing an injustice to
this segement of the industry. The smaller firms, at least those who
h1bid., p. 3.
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aspire to some degree of respectability and permanence, serve the good
of the industry in several ways. In rega.rd to the lumber market the
emphasis on price by these firms often is a major factor in keeping the
price schedules of the large lumber manufacturers in line. Singly.
the small firms have little or no effect on the market, but taken col-
lectively they can exert great pressure on the market, forcing the giants
of the industry to use moderation in their atten~ts to raise lumber prices. 5
In the area of logging and milling many of the smaller firms are at
last beginning to realize the importance of adopting and practicing sound-
er conservation habits. Lacking funds and large timber reserves, these
firms are naturally less inclined to become involved in extensive con-
servation programs. However, the more progressive small mills are· begin-
ning to understand that their best chance for survival is to concentrate
on those areas of production which the larger mills find unprofita.ble
because of their size and ma.nufacturing policies, and in doing so these
smaller mills have also become active participants in the modern con-
servation movement. Many smaller firms have found that they can make
money by concentrating on milling tllfiber passed over by their larger
competitors. These large mills often can not afford to spend their time,
effort, and money in specialized thinning or salvage operations, and they
have found that by contracting this ,vork out to the small logging firms
and mills, everyone can benefit. Also, by specializing in one. or two
particular products, such as 2 x 4 studs or cedar siding products, and
50f the 32,916 separate manufacturing units in 1964, 32,842 or
99.8% of them were l~ber firms producing less than 50,000,000 board
.feet per year (Statistical Abstract - 1964, p. 688.).
118
by selling their waste material, such as sawdust and wood chips, to the
large, integrated timber processors, the small independents not only in-
crease their profit margins, but make a substantial contribution to the
concept of full utilization of the timber resource. Many of these mills
·have been able to tear down their waste burners as a result of their con-
servation efforts at the mill level, much to the approval of the general
public. The significance of this.enlightened effort on the part of some
small lumbermen is that the conservation movement now has industry-wide
support.
However, in spite of their efforts the small independent firms can.
never hope to approach the position of leadership and influence attained
by the few giants of the lumber industry. \'Jith their e-ergence at the
turn of the century in the Pacific Northwest these large corporations
brought to the industry those elements needed to mod~rnize it and to help
it keep pace ''lith the advances being made in other manufacturing fields.
By the~r very nature of organization the large firms, s~ch as Weyerhaeuser,
have revolutionized the industry by the degree to which they have integrat-
ed the various phases of their operations and by the manner in which they
have diversified their manufacturing into timber product "fields other
than IQmber. No longer can they be called lumber companies in the tra-
ditional sense of the term. Instead, the term "timber processors" better
describes the total scope of their operations. All have "integrated
horizonally. Th~y have become multi-mill firms in all of their product
lines, scattering their related holdings over the country and even in the
case of a few of these corporations, to foreign cOlliltries. Some have
also expanded their operations vertically, oltming and operating all pha.ses
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of production from the processing of the raw material to the trans- .
portation involved in getting the finished product to the market, to
the retail marketing of the product.
These twin drives toward integration and diversification reflect
a basic change in lumbering philosophy which evolved with the emergence
of the large timber .processors. Through research and experimental
operations, such as Weyerhaeuser's early pilot mill at Everett, Wash-
ington, the lumber giants of the twentieth century found that not only
could products be ma.de from former waste material but that there were
profitable markets for these products. Once this discovery "\-'las made,
the concept of full utilization of the timber resource quickly follo1;red.
vJhere formerly the entire industry was oriented around a policy of IIcut-
ting only the best and leaving the rest,l.I the new industry leaders with
their practice of full utilization began to eliminate such words as
"waste burner" and "weed species tI from their vocabulary. As has al-
ready been noted, -the acceptance of this new philosophy of lumbering
has grown to the point that today even many of the smaller mills are
finding ways to use full utilization of their timber to better their
position in the industry.
The importance of the large timber processors is further evident
in the tremendous changes· which they have brought not only to the lum-
bering industry itself but to the general economy as a result of their
form of organization and their revolutionary philosophy. Of primary
lifiportance to the lumber industry is the leadership which these few firms
have brought to an industry which historically has had no real leadership.
Since the early 1900's these firms have led the crusade within the in-
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dustry to improve lumber's image before the public. Rising above the
traditional isola~ionism and mistrust of their smaller competitors,
Weyerhaeuser and the other leaders realized the need for industrial
associations which would bring standardization and uniformity to the
.areas of lumber manufacturing and marketing. Their l'lillingness to re-
linquish part of the~r corporate sovereignty to s~ch industrial groups
as the '~est Coast Lumberman's Association and the Weatern Pine Associ-
ation proved to be the stimulus needed to get these organizations start-
ed. The resultant effect on the industry is quite apparent.. These
associations through their formal grading rules and quality control ef-
forts have b~ought the long sought product standardization and uniform-
ity to the industry. The industrial advertising and other aspects of
their public education program have made great advancements in build-
ing a better public image of the lumber industry and in doing so have
increased the demand for lumber.
The leadership of the large lumber companies has also been most
strong in the area of research and innovation. Lacking surplus funds
to promote such product development and improvement studies, the smaller
lumber concerns must look to the larger organizations for any research
advancements. The large companies have responded to this challenge by
setting up research centers and by allocating a large portion of their
yearly earnings to this phase of their operation. 6 The results of this
effort are appar~nt in the greatly increased number of different timber
products. Not only' have the basic lumber items been made better, but a
6.For example, Heyerhaeuser Co. currently spends approxima.tely
$5 million annually in its research program (Information gained from a
Weyerhaeuser official who wishes to remain unidentified).
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host of products unrelated to lwnber have been developed. Included"
in these new items are the various fiber products, chemicals, and paper
pulp processes which are able to produce the entire range of paper pro-
ducts from the finest writing papers to packaging materials which have
"revolutionized the packaging industry. Initially, the efforts of the
large timber processors in the areas of research and product develop-
ment have been generated by the individual companyfs desire to improve
its profits, but in the final analysis it has been the entire industry
and society as a whole who have benefited, for as more forest products
are developed, each serves the dual role of benefiting society and of
better utilizing our forestland and its resources.
As their knowledge of the timber resource grew, so to did the
awareness of these large firms in the urgent need to formulate a sound
conservation policy. Their rapidly growing operations coupled with the
reality that there would be no new forests to conquer after the cutting
of the Pacific Northwest woods, forced the giants of the industry to
take a bold stand against the industry's traditional lack of conservc3.t-
ion. Responding to the initial efforts in conservation by the U.S. For-
est Service in the first decades of the century, the larger, private
lumber corporations soon became lea,ders in promoting the movement l,fithin
the industry. This endeavor has paid handsome dividends in several re-
spects. Inaugurating their campaigns at a time when public opinion was
quite'set again~t the private timber interests of the country, the- large
firms, such as ~~eyerhaeuser, introduced the hitherto unheard of concepts
of full utilization of their timber resource and of sustained yield with
its appealing tree farm aspect. Advertising their-intentions and pro-
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gress in the field of conservation, often in the same popular period-
icals which were attacking the private lumbennen for their lack of con-
servation, the industry's leaders were able to turn the tide of public
opinion.
However, even if there had been no public pressure brought to
bear on the lumber industry to improve its conservation policies, there
would have no doubt been a strong effort made to establish a sound con-
servation stand. The emerging giants of the industry had too much at
stake in their extensive operations to allow themselves to make the
same mista.kes which the industry had committed in other areas. The les-
sons of Maine, ~tichigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota had not fallen. on
entirely deaf ears~ The situation had been different in those earlier
regions. Now, in the Pacific Northwest, it had finally come dmill to a
basic question of a choice between conservation of the natural resource
or extinction of the industry. The realization that timber and its
perpetuation is the key to the industry's growth, wealth, and permanence
led to the choice in favor of conservation, and with the large timber
processing firms showing the way with their enlightened conservation
policies both in the woods and in the mills, the lumber industry enter-
ed a new era.
Moreover, the leadership of the industry's giants did not fade once
they began this revolution vrithin the industry. Their ideas of full
utilization and sustained yield had a greater significance than simply
fulfilling the basic requirements of a sound conse~vation plan. They
carried the added implication that these firms intended to become per-
manent ·fixtures in the economy of the Pacific Northwest in general and in.
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the economy of the various mill towns in particular. It was no longer
to be a case of IIcut out and get out II for these large firms with the
resulting depressing effect upon the region's economy. The leade~s of
these companies, such as R.A. Long with his vision of permanent Long-
. Bell and Heyerhaeuser operations in Longview, began placing their re-
liance in stability and permanence with tpe emphasis on a long term
profit rather than on the short sighted, short term profit mo~ives of
the industry's past.
The.results of these efforts on the part of the large timber pro-
cessors have been as gratifying to themselves, the lumber industry, and
society as have been their efforts at conservation. The stability and
permanence of these large corporations has brought a. corresponding
stability and permanence to the economy and social order of the Pacific
North\fest and other lumbering regions where these firms have an influence.
The days of the ghost tmms and the migratory labor force resulting from
an ever shifting lumber industry have passed from the scene for good.?
?Such changes did not take place immediately. Even the lumbering
region of the Pacific Northwest after the advent of the large firms had
its nomadic labor problems with its accompanying unrest upon the economic,
social, and political levels of the region's life •. The nature of the
conditions within the industry in the Pacific North~-vest during this trans-
ition period are revealed in the following passage taken from an article
by a pro-labor writer of the period:
All of these three principal occupations of the unskilled worker
of the- Pacific Coast - lumber, construction work, and agriculture -
are periodical in their nature • • • • The result of this is the ex-
istence on the Coast of an ~mense army of 'unskilled or semi-sxilled
workers, of 'no fixed abode, vIho are forever engaged in an eternal
chase,for the elusive job; whose work takes them avray from the tm~s
to the hills or plains or forests, for varying periods. Forever over
the great western country are they traveling, seeking this or that
center of temporary activity, that they may dispose of their labor-·
pOvrer (Charles Ashleigh, liThe Floater tl as reproduced by Joyce L. Korn-
bluh (ed.), Rebel Voices (Ann Arbor : University of l-lichigan Press,
1964) ,. p. 80.).
In their place have come permanent cities and towns and a work force
which reflects the stability of the present industry. These communities
have gr~ill with their primary timber industry. The integration and
diversification of the large timber firms have greatly added to the
economic soundness of these communities and the general region, giving
them a future quite unlike that of their historical counterparts in the
East and Upper Kidwest.
In retrospect, the emergence of the large tlinber processing cor-
porations marked a definite turning point in the history of the lmnber
industry. The industry brought some two hundred years of lumbering tra-
dition vlith it to the western forests only to find that many of the old
ways which had worked so well in-other regions would no longer suffice.
If the industry was to survive as a. vital part of the nation's econor~,
sOlnething drastic had to be done to cha.nge the industry's course. It
was left to a handful of. lumbermen to lead the entire lumber industry
out of the woods. Combining their foresight, their finances, their abil-
ities, and their courage, they were able to assess the strengths and the
weaknesses of the past, and they then laid the fOlmdations upon which
a new era of economic grovrth could be built.
.'
APPENDIX
Oregon
California
Total
TABLE 9
TIMBER HOLDINGS IN THE HEST OF THE
SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAIIROAD - 1912a
Timberlands
(acres)
1,907,236
1,934,580
3,841,816
Timber
(billion feet)
70.5
35.1
105".6
aThe Lum~er Industry, II, pp. 5-6.
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TABLE 10
TIl-18ER HOLDINGS IN THE vITST OF THE
\ffiYEHHAEU3ER TIMJKB. CO. ~ 19l2a
vlashington
Oregon
California
Total
Timberlands
(acres)
1,515,932
380,599
__4,905
1,901,436
Timber
(billion feet)
76.9
18.7
95.7
aThe Lumber Industry, II, pp. 5-6. The figures in Table 10 in-
clude just the Jleyerhaeuser Timber Co. and those subsidiary companies
directly controlled by it at the tline.
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TABLE 11
TOTAL v'IEYERHAEUSER SYNDICATE TINBER
HOLDINGS IN THE ENTIRE NATION - 1912a
Pacific
Northwest
(Figures in billion feet)
Southern Lake
Pine Area States Total
Heyerhaeuser
Timber Co. 95.7
other~~- 132.8 48.7 14.7
Total 228.5 48.7 14.7
95.7
196.2
291.9
?~onsists of other companies in which Weyerhaeuser family
- members and/or other members of the syndicate held in-
terests.
aThe Lumber Industry, II, pp. 5-6.
TABLE 12
TIMBER HOLDINGS IN THE villSTOF THE
NORTHfu~N PACIFIC RAILROAD '- 1909a
Patented~~ Unpatented-~~ Total
T:lmberland
(acres)
Timber
(billion feet)
Timberland
(acres)
Timber
(billion feet)
Timberland
(acres)
Timber
(billion feet)
Washington 486,877
Idaho 182,505
Montana 480,486
Total 1,149,868
10.4
2.7
2.6
15.7
1,015,427
141,625
394,543
1,551,595
14.8
1.8
2.2
18.8
1,502,304 '
324,130
1,152,589
2,979,023
25.2
4.5
~
36.2
~rpatented land refers to that portion of the land grant for which the Northern Pacific had
actual ownership title. 'Unpatented land refers to that portion of the land grant for which
the Northern Pacific had an option on but as of this date (1909) had not filed with the
Land Office for title of actual ownership. Normally this action could not be taken until
the railr~ad had actually been built along the right-of-way in question.
aThe Lumber Industry, II, p. 8.
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. TABLE 13
LEADING STATES IN THE PRODUCTION
OF ~'mITE PINE LUlillER., 186.9 - 1965a
(All quantities per 1,000 board foot measure)
1869;} 1879~~ 1889~~ 1899 1910
IvIaine 450,000 332,000 300,000 214,865 272,509
NevT York 721,000 ~.63,000 223,000 117,237 70,990
Pennsylvania 780,000 620,000 453,000 225,047 82,116
Nichigan 1,714,000 3,550,000 3,L~98 ,000 1,234,514 128,400
Wisconsin 783,000 1,112,000 2,451,000 2,340,628 577,674
Hinnesota 230,000 524,000 1,209,000 2,157,866 1,280,239
Idaho ------- ------- 3,000 1,990 232,442
1920 1930 ~940 1945 1965
Naine 165,102 110,834 131,294 263,149 ?H~------
New York 66,311 10,280 18,644 100,429 ---~--~H~
Pennsylvania 29,004 10,779 12,260 39,030 ~~~i-_....-----
36,186 19,239 24,976 34,514 ~H~¥J.ichigan -------
\'fisconsin 88,976 42,153 42,706 93,792 ~~~~------
~Iinnesota 429,210 144,391 79,863 45,603 ~~~~------
Idaho 261,251 432,438 421,538 220,321 300, 944b
~'..
"Based on census reports which gave quantities for states but not
for kinds (species) of wood~
~H:-Figures not available by species by state.
aU.s., Department of Agriculture, Lumber Production in the United
States: 1799 - 1946 (1Jashington: U.3. Goverrunent Printing Office, 1947), p.. 217.
~destern 1100d Products Association, Statistical Yearbook - 1965
(Portland: l'festern Hood Products Association, 1965), p. S-8.
TABLE 14
LEADING STATES IN THE PRODUCTION
OF DOUGLAS FIR LL~BER, 1869-1965a
(All quantities per 1,000 board foot measure)
1869~~ 1879~~ 1889~~ 1899 1910 1920 1930
Oregon 54,000 130,000 301,000 501,237 1,714,462 2,347,36EL 2,359,062
Hashington 107,000 124,000 847,000. 1,152,672 3,259,546 4,275,017 3,826,066
1940 1945 1950b, 1955b 1960b 1965b
Oregon 3,251,187 ·3,501,773 6,340,106 5,856,331 4,471,491 4,107,710 !---J
W
Washington 3,509,266 2,128,029 2,040,312 1,645,377 1,153,007 1,125,114
!---J
..)~
"Based on census reports which gave quantities for states but not for
kinds (species) of wood.
aU•S ., Department of Agriculture, Lumber Production in the United States, 1799 to 1946 (Wash-
ington: U.S •. Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 196-97.
~western ~food Products Association, Statistical Yearbook - 1965 (Portland: Western Wood Products
Association, 1965), p. 3-5.
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